# 1NC

### Off

#### “Reduce” means permanent – it has to come off the books

Words & Phrases: Permanent Edition, 2002, vol 36b, p.80

N.Y.A.D. 3 Dept. 1959. The word "reduce" as used in section of Civil Service Law providing that the pension of a disability beneficiary shall be "reduced" in the event that such disability beneficiary is engaged in a gainful occupation means permanently reduced or forfeited not merely temporarily suspended. Civil Service Law, § 83.— Montesani Levitt, 189 N.Y.S.2d 695, 9 A.D.2d 51.—States 64.1(3).

#### Restrictions on production are distinct from restrictions on transport and use

Moniz 2000 [Ernest J. Under Secretary for Energy, Science and Environment U.S. Department of Energy “Testimony Before the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs” Federal News Service June 29, lexis]

The production, transport and conversion of energy is fundamental to our way of life and continued economic prosperity, but energy has more significant effects on the environment than any other economic activity. To reduce these adverse effects, the federal and state governments have imposed environmental restrictions on energy, from production to end-use.

#### The aff does not reduce restrictions- they just don’t enforce them and prevent future restrictions- the aff also eliminates restrictions on emissions from the non- production parts of energy generation

#### Vote neg

#### Limits- creates an explosion of mechanisms and kills link uniqueness- the aff can say that leaving the restrictions on the books means our DA’s are irrelevant but the decision not to enforce them solves the industry- their aff is a neg CP

#### Extra topicality- they eliminate external restrictions- eliminates neg solvency arguments about the post production process which is negative ground

### Off

#### Text: The U.S. Supreme Court should rule …

#### Supreme court can rule against restrictions on energy production

Craig 2010 (Robin Kundis Craig, Attorneys' Title Professor and Associate Dean for Environmental Programs at Florida State University College of Law, Summer 2010, “MULTISTATE DECISION MAKING FOR RENEWABLE ENERGY AND TRANSMISSION: SPOTLIGHT ON COLORADO, NEW MEXICO, UTAH, AND WYOMING: Constitutional Contours for the Design and Implementation of Multistate Renewable Energy Programs and Projects,” University of Colorado Law Review, Lexis)

A number of dormant Commerce Clause cases have involved energy production, and they systematically conclude that states cannot create legal requirements or preferences based on the source of the fuel or energy. In Wyoming v. Oklahoma, for example, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down an Oklahoma statute that required Oklahoma coal-fired electric power plants producing power for sale in Oklahoma to burn a mixture of coal containing at least ten percent Oklahoma-mined coal. 121 Moreover, the "savings clause" of the Federal Power Act did not prevent the conclusion that the Oklahoma statute was unconstitutional. 122 Similarly, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois concluded that a Clean Air Act compliance plan that favored Illinois coalviolated the dormant Commerce Clause. 123¶ Nor can states "hoard" state-created energy within their borders. Thus, in 1982, the U.S. Supreme Court concluded that New Hampshire could not constitutionally restrict interstate transportation of hydroelectric power generated in New Hampshire. 124

#### The counterplan is not a *reduction*—it requires executive/congressional acquiescence.

Spiro, 2001 (Peter J. Spiro, Professor, Hofstra University School of Law; Visiting Professor, University of Texas School of Law, Texas Law Review, April, lexis)

The increments approach answers these objections, at the same time that it affirms the value of constitutionalism. It presents, first of all, a determinate method of constitutional location. Unlike translation exercises, the increments model substantially confines the possible discretion of individual constitutional actors, including the judiciary. Working from a premise of historical situatedness, the theory denies the possibility of independent constitutional determination. That is not to deny the inevitability of constitutional change. But all constitutional actors work from a baseline, departures from which can be challenged and rejected by other constitutional actors. Constitutional norms are resolved only by the interplay of those actors. The content of constitutional norms will usually be reflected in institutional action, but one cannot necessarily find the law by reference to the action of any single institution alone. Even if the Supreme Court attempted to exploit the discretion afforded it by a translation model, its pronouncements amount to mere artifacts in the absence of acceptance by other actors. The increments model thus answers the primary volley of the originalists against countermajoritarian judicial adaptation of the constitutional text. Such adaptation will not prevail where it is rejected by other actors.

### Off

#### **Job Numbers to help Obama, cement re-election**

Nate Silver. 10-5-12. Jobs News Makes Obama’s Case Easier http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/10/05/jobs-news-makes-obamas-case-easier/

Thus, the threshold for what counts as an economically and politically significant jobs report ought to be fairly high. Not every month’s report can or should be a “game-changer.” Indeed, the public has often reacted more calmly to both good and bad monthly jobs reports than the political cognoscenti do. Was Friday’s jobs report, which showed 114,000 jobs added in September and the unemployment rate dropping to 7.8 percent, strong enough to be one of the exceptional cases? My view is that the answer is yes: this report really does warrant some attention. The reported payrolls growth figure for September, 114,000 jobs, was incredibly close to consensus forecasts of about 115,000 jobs added. But everything else about the report considerably beat expectations. Jobs figures were revised upward by 40,000 in July, and by 46,000 in August. Combined with the jobs growth in September, that means the economy added 200,000 more jobs than we thought previously. The unemployment rate is calculated through a separate survey — one of households rather than business establishments. The data from the household survey tends to be even noisier than that from the establishment survey. But unlike last month, when a decline in the unemployment rate was caused by the exit of workers from the labor force, the household survey also reflected genuinely good news in September. According to that survey, 413,000 workers joined the labor force in September. But 873,000 more people became employed, causing the unemployment rate to fall to 7.8 percent. If the September numbers resulted in part from statistical variance, it is certainly possible that there will be some payback in the October report, which will be released the Friday before the Nov. 6 election. But it is also possible that the strength shown in the government’s report on Friday reflects it playing catch up. The firm ADP, which tracks private-sector payrolls, had reported that an average of 170,000 private-sector jobs had been created each month so far this year. The ADP reports are much maligned because they do not always match the government’s payroll figures over the short run. But in the long run, the numbers tend to converge. Furthermore, there has been a fairly consistent pattern of upward revisions to the government’s jobs reports recently. The jobs numbers are certainly not enough to change the basic story of a slow economic recovery, and it will take many years for the economy to get back to full employment. However, the jobs numbers are one of the more hopeful signs for the economy on balance. An average of 146,000 jobs have been created per month over the past year, or closer to 157,000 with the government’s anticipated benchmark revisions accounted for. Those aren’t great numbers by any means, and would translate to an annualized growth rate of 1.4 percent. But over the past 25 years, payroll jobs have grown at an annualized rate of 1.1 percent, or the equivalent of about 125,000 jobs added per month given today’s population. By this measure, it’s been a fairly average economic year, although certainly not enough to make up for the productivity that was lost from the economy in 2008 and 2009. The rate of jobs growth is now just slightly behind the one that was enough to re-elect George W. Bush in 2004, when an average of 168,000 jobs were created between January and September 2004. Although the unemployment rate remains stubbornly high, the recent trajectory now looks more favorable. Unemployment has fallen by 0.7 percent since December 2011, to 7.8 percent from 8.5 percent. Historically, there has been no relationship at all between the unemployment rate on Election Day and the incumbent’s performance. However, there has been a relationship between the change in the unemployment rate in the months leading up to the election and how well the incumbent does. The decline in unemployment under Mr. Obama this year since December is the largest in an election year since Ronald Reagan’s re-election bid, when it declined to 7.3 percent in Sept. 1984 from 8.3 percent in Dec. 1983. The drop in unemployment alone is no guarantee of re-election — there was also a considerable drop in unemployment in 1976, and Gerald Ford lost. However, the FiveThirtyEight economic index, which accounts for the payrolls numbers along with six other economic data series, would project a narrow re-election for Mr. Obama by about 3 percentage points — similar to Mr. Bush’s margin over John Kerry in 2004. Especially with the Friday jobs report, the economic numbers now seem just strong enough to make the incumbent a favorite for re-election, based on the way the public has evaluated their presidents historically. I’m less inclined to predict what immediate effect the numbers will have on the polls — whether Friday’s news outweighs, for instance, Mr. Obama’s poor performance in Wednesday night’s debate. Mr. Obama did not win the election on Friday any more than he lost it on Wednesday. But for the first time in a long while, Mr. Obama should be happy if the discussion turns toward the economy.

#### Fracking is a political loser – misinformation campaigns destroy public support

Everley, 12 - Energy In Depth Spokesperson

(Steve, July 13, "Misinformation Campaign Targets Hydraulic Fracturing," Lexis,

But it was also that rapid expansion -- especially into areas such as Pennsylvania -- that offered an opening to environmental groups. Preying on a population unaccustomed to large-scale oil and gas development, activists were able to make an innovative combination of their own, blending a scary, almost inappropriate-sounding word ("frack") with alleged environmental and social impacts, many of which -- like air emissions and certain forms of water contamination -- can supposedly be impacting you without you even knowing it. Uncertainty breeds fear, and a fearful public, the opposition found, is much easier to manipulate. Professional activists, shrewdly political in their talking points, also know that the word "fracking" elicits negative reactions in the public. As the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette observed: "Anti-drilling activists love using ‘fracking' as a double entendre (‘Don't frack with us') because it bears a resemblance to one of George Carlin's seven dirty words." And recent polling backs them up: A survey by Louisiana State University found that only 34.5 percent of respondents who heard the word "fracking" thought the process was safe, and only 38.6 percent of those who heard the word said there should be more drilling. When the respondents were given a description of the process instead of the word "fracking," however, the percentage who said the process is safe jumped by nearly ten points, and support for more drilling climbed by more than 12 points into a clear majority. Imagine that: a fact-based discussion leads to different results than one based on semantics and talking points. That gap in public support is also why opponents describe everything happening in oil and gas development -- from initial geological surveying to well pad preparation to pipeline construction -- as "fracking." Never mind that the impacts they cite are not due to hydraulic fracturing. Since hydraulic fracturing is one part of the process, they claim, all of the impacts can be attributed to "fracking." It's a politically convenient (and intellectually lazy) effort to scapegoat a process that opponents do not really understand, but that they know sounds destructive.

#### Approval ratings are key to the election

Cook, The National Journal Political Analyst, 11

(Charlie, October 27, “Underwater,” http://www.nationaljournal.com/columns/cook-report/the-cook-report-obama-underwater-20111027, d/a 7-20-12, ads)

The best barometer of how a president is going to fare is his approval rating, which starts taking on predictive value about a year out. As each month goes by, the rating becomes a better indicator of the eventual results. Presidents with approval numbers above 48 to 50 percent in the Gallup Poll win reelection. Those with approval ratings below that level usually lose. If voters don’t approve of the job you are doing after four years in office, they usually don’t vote for you. Of course, a candidate can win the popular vote and still lose the Electoral College. It happened to Samuel Tilden in 1876, Grover Cleveland in 1888, and Al Gore in 2000. But the popular votes and the Electoral College numbers usually come down on the same side.

#### Obama win key to US-Russia relations – Romney’s agenda is belligerent and controversial.

Reichardt 7/9. (Adam is the Managing Editor of New Eastern Europe, “Considering Russia in the Voting Booth,” New Eastern Europe, 2012, http://www.neweasterneurope.eu/node/382)

Obama’s policy towards Russia is easier to gauge, since there has already been four years of his administration to judge. As Ross Wilson noted, “President Obama has a four-year record with Russia to defend – i.e., the reset policy and the benefits that the administration will argue have accrued from its more pragmatic and less confrontational approach to relations with Moscow.” President Obama’s policy of reset was indeed a glimmer of hope for US-Russian relations at the start of 2009, but that glimmer has all but faded. The case of Syria and Iran are clear examples of the real challenges America still faces when engaging with Russia on global issues and the Obama campaign will most likely avoid referring to the “reset” by name. “Though the Administration will not use the expression ‘reset’ too much, it can be expected to continue to emphasize pragmatism and to implement that line if the president is re-elected,” Wilson believes. Obama’s opponent, Mitt Romney, has been less clear about his position on relations with Russia, but what is revealed in recent statements and on his website shows a more controversial approach. Most telling were the comments Romney made in June 2012. On Russia, Romney has stated: "The nation which consistently opposes our actions at the United Nations has been Russia. We're of course not enemies. We're not fighting each other. There's no Cold War, but Russia is a geopolitical foe in that regard." The Romney campaign’s web site reveals several areas of focus for Russia, none of them discuss active engagement, but rather focus on taking tougher stances with Russia, including renegotiating the New Start Treaty, decreasing Europe’s energy reliance on Russia, building stronger relations with Central Asia, as well as supporting Russia’s civil society. Surprisingly, the last one, engaging Russia’s civil society, could be the most controversial. The Romney campaign web site provides a strongly worded statement that “A Romney administration will be forthright in confronting the Russian government over its authoritarian practices.” Indeed, America needs a strong leader to stand up for its position in the world, however confronting Russia on internal issues may not only offend most Russians, even in the opposition – it could hurt the entire goal of this platform. Having the American government play an active role in the changes happening inside Russia could be detrimental to US-Russian relations. Many Russians believe that changes within their own country should be driven from the Russian society. Any outside interference would hurt the legitimacy of the Russian opposition and cause the Russian elite to become even more suspicious, and perhaps even hostile, to the intentions of American foreign policy.

#### U.S.-Russian war causes extinction – most probable

Bostrom ‘2 [Nick Bostrom, professor of philosophy - Oxford University, March, 2002, Existential Risks: Analyzing Human Extinction Scenarios and Related Hazards, Journal of Evolution and Technology, p. http://www.nickbostrom.com/existential/risks.html]

A much greater existential risk emerged with the build-up of nuclear arsenals in the US and the USSR. An all-out nuclear war was a possibility with both a substantial probability and with consequences that might have been persistent enough to qualify as global and terminal. There was a real worry among those best acquainted with the information available at the time that a nuclear Armageddon would occur and that it might annihilate our species or permanently destroy human civilization.[4] Russia and the US retain large nuclear arsenals that could be used in a future confrontation, either accidentally or deliberately. There is also a risk that other states may one day build up large nuclear arsenals. Note however that a smaller nuclear exchange, between India and Pakistan for instance, is not an existential risk, since it would not destroy or thwart humankind’s potential permanently. Such a war might however be a local terminal risk for the cities most likely to be targeted. Unfortunately, we shall see that nuclear Armageddon and comet or asteroid strikes are mere preludes to the existential risks that we will encounter in the 21st century.

### Off

#### The discourse of energy independence is a vehicle to affirm American exceptionalism

Sebastian Herbstreuth is a PhD candidate in the Department of Politics and International Studies (POLIS) at the University of Cambridge April 13, 2012 “Should America Care About Energy Independence?” Politics in Spires http://politicsinspires.org/2012/04/should-america-care-about-energy-independence/

However, thinking about oil only in the language of solutions overlooks an important point: that the condition of “foreign oil dependence” and the aspiration of “energy independence” are also discourses that reflect, and serve to actualize, American culture and identity. For the past forty years, these twin notions have acted as big ideas around which all Americans could rally to affirm images of self and other. The notion of foreign oil dependence, for instance, has always been intimately connected with threats that have far exceeded the traditional realm of “national security” and include threats to American identity. One major concern has linked dependency with the continued viability of a specifically American, suburban, automotive way of life. Another is the promise of economic growth, individual opportunity, and social mobility — all encapsulated in the American dream. At the same time, the nature of the dangers inherent in foreign oil has changed with the times. In the 1970s, reliance on OPEC oil was routinely assumed to pose an existential threat to the existence of a liberal, US-led international order. In the context of a widespread sense of American decline, what seemed to be at stake was nothing less than the status of the United States as a great power and the leader of the free world. In post-9/11 energy debates, by contrast, foreign oil dependence has been linked to American identity in new ways. Middle East oil has become bound up with the notion of a clash of civilizations and the threat posed by radical Islam, both of which are said to imply a fundamental challenge to the American way of life. As George W. Bush routinely affirmed with a view to the Middle East: “it jeopardizes our national security to be dependent on sources of energy from countries that don’t care for America, what we stand for, what we love”. [3] From this perspective, what matters most about dependency is that it has constituted the basis for an encounter between the United States and oil’s foreign places of origin—an encounter that has afforded American society an ongoing opportunity for self-representation and the drawing of cultural boundaries. The notion of energy interdependence is even more powerful in this regard. The longevity and popularity of the absurd idea that the United States could ever return to the self-sufficiency of the first half of the 20th century has long puzzled energy experts. “What is it about ‘energy independence’”, wonders ex Shell-CEO John Hofmeister, “that keeps this mantra in the political rhetoric of political campaign after campaign?” [4] Perhaps, the best answer is that energy independence has never been a simple technical, economic or political solution to the problem of foreign oil dependence; rather, it has been a cultural artifact, a discourse evoking particular American notions of the exceptional nation, American innovation and ingenuity, the can-do spirit, and the very notion of “independence” on which the American national project has been built. As Hofmeister puts is: “There’s something earthy, powerful, atavistic, and pugilistic, even legitimately xenophobic about saying [energy independence]. It speaks for all Americans regardless of gender, ethnicity or age”. [4]

#### Exceptionalism leads to extinction- produces a denial of death that demands constant causalities

Peterson ‘7 (Christopher, Lecturer @ University of Western Sidney, Kindred Specters: Death, Mourning, and American Affinity, pgs. 3-8)

While this study accords with the claim that American culture disavows mortality, 1 do not argue for any simple reversal of this interdiction with an aim toward affirming finitude per se. If death is beyond our experience (as Heidegger among others has observed), if I am ultimately absent from "my" own death, then strictly speaking there is nothing for me to recognize or avow. Yet dying is something that I do every day. Indeed, it might be more accurate to say that American culture disavows dying, understood as a process that extends from our birth to our biological demise." Even with such an amended formulation, however, it is not entirely clear whether dying can ever be fully affirmed or avowed. That "we live as if we were not going to die," as Zygmunt Bauman observes, "is a remarkable achievement," especially given the ease with which we disavow dying on a daily basis." Some degree of disavowal would seem both unavoidable and necessary for our survival. Any effort to prolong one's life, from simply eating well and exercising to taking medications to prevent or treat illness, evidences this disavowal. For Bauman, however, the disavowal of dying often has violent political and social consequences. Noting the wartime imperative "to limit our casualties" for instance, Bauman remarks that "the price of that limiting is multiplying the dead on the other side of the battleline" (34). Drawing from Freud's claim that, "at bottom no one believes in his own death," Bauman argues that death is "socially managed" by securing the "immortality" of the few through the mortalization of others (35, his emphasis).8 The belief in my self-presence, which is also always a belief in my immortality, is thus dialectically conditioned by the nonpresence of others. Scholars in race and sexuality studies have done much to bring our attention to the ways in which American culture represents racial and sexual minorities as dead - both figuratively and literally. Indeed, this gesture both accompanies and reinforces the larger cultural dissimulation of mortality by making racial and sexual others stand in for the death that haunts every life. The history of American slavery tells a familiar story of how American consciousness disavows and projects mortality onto its "others." Orlando Patterson has described the institution of slavery in terms of a process of kinship delegitimation that constructs slaves as "socially dead."? For Patterson, slavery - across its various historical forms - emerges as a substitute for death a forced bargain by which the slave retains his/her life only to enter into the liminal existence of the socially dead. As a substitution for death slavery does not "absolve or erase the prospect of death," for the specter of material death looms over the slave's existence as an irreducible remainder (5). This primary stage in the construction of the socially dead person is followed by what Patterson refers to as the slave's "natal alienation," his/her alienation from all rights or claims of birth: in short, a severing of all genealogical ties and claims both to the slave's living blood relatives, and to his/her remote ancestors and future descendants. Although Patterson does not approach the problem of social death through a psychoanalytic vocabulary of disavowal and projection, one might say that the presumptive ontology of slave-owning, legally recognized kinship, was dependent on a deontologization of slave kinship that worked to deny the death that each life bears within itself. Building on Patterson's argument, Toni Morrison observes in Playing in the Dark that, "for a people who made much of their 'newness' - their potential, freedom, and innocence - it is striking how dour, how troubled, how frightened and haunted our early and founding literature truly is." For Morrison, African-American slaves came to shoulder the burden of the darkness (both moral and racial) against which America defined itself. The shadow of a racialized blackness did not so much threaten the ostensible "newness" of American life as it conditioned the latter's appearance as new and free. Hence "freedom," she writes, "has no meaning ... without the specter of enslavement" (56). Echoing Morrison, Russ Castronovo asserts in Necro Citizenship that nineteenth-century American politics constructed the citizen in relation to a morbid fascination with ghosts, seances, spirit rappings, and mesmerism. Taking his point of departure from Patrick Henry's in-famous assertion, "give me liberty or give me death," Castronovo explores how admission into the domain of citizenship required a certain depoliticization and pacification of the subject: "The afterlife emancipates souls from passionate debates, everyday engagements, and earthly affairs that animate the political field."!' From Lincoln's rumored dabbling in spiritualism, to attempts by mediums to contact the departed souls of famous Americans, to a senator's introduction of a petition in 1854 asking Congress to investigate communications with the "other side" so numerous are Castronovo's examples of what he calls" spectral politics" that we would have a difficult time contesting his diagnosis that nineteenth-century American political discourse worked to produce politically and historically dead citizens. That these citizens were constructed in tandem with the production of large slave populations- noncitizens who were urged by slavery proponents and abolitionists alike to believe that emancipation existed in a promised afterlife - would lend still more credence to the argument that nineteenth-century America propagated a dematerialized politics. One wonders, however, how Castronovo's argument sits in relation to Aries's contention that American life tends toward an interdiction of death, and if Castronovo's rejection of necropolitics, moreover, is not finally symptomatic of this very disavowal. Castronovo maintains that, "for cultures that fear death ... necrophilia promotes fascination with and helps tame an unknowable terror:' (5). American necrophilia, according to Castronovo, responds to an overwhelming fear and denial of death. Castronovo thus aims 'to turn us away from such preoccupation with ghosts, spirits, and the afterlife toward "specific forms of corporeality," such as the laboring body, the slave body, and the mesmerized body, in order to avoid "reinscrib[ing] patterns of abstraction" (17). Yet, this move away from general to specific forms of embodiment still retains the notion of "the body," and therefore of a self-contained, sell-present entity. If nineteenth-century politics required that the citizen be disembodied and dematerialized, it does not follow that a move toward embodiment remedies such a spiritualized politics. Although Castronovo cautions that recourse to the body" does not automatically guarantee resistance," the overall tenor of his project pathologizes the spectral (18). Indeed, one has the sense that Castronovo would like to untether politics from death altogether - as if political life is not always haunted by finitude. Reversing the terms of political necrophilia, he offers something like a political necrophobia that sees every intrusion of the spectral as synonymous with depoliticization. If nineteenth-century spiritualism infused American political life with a familiar set of distinctions between spirit/matter, soul/body, that says nothing about how these binaries might be displaced rather than merely reversed. A binaristic approach to the subject of mortality is also legible in Sharon Holland's Raising the Dead, which asserts that "bringing back the dead (or saving the living from the shadow of death) is the ultimate queer act."11Drawing from the activist slogan "silence = death" from the early years of the AIDS epidemic, and extending this activist imperative to address the social death of sexual and racial minorities more generally, Holland observes that the deaths of queer and racial subjects serve "to ward off a nation's collective dread of the inevitable" (38). Yet, as in Castronovo's critique of necropolitics, this imperative to "raise the dead" reverses rather than displaces the logic through which dominant, white, heterosexual culture disavows and projects mortality onto racial and sexual minorities. While we must address the particular effects that social death has on racial and sexual minorities, this social reality must also be thought in relation to a more generalizable principle of mourning. For the "shadow of death" haunts all lives, not just queer ones. The "ultimate queer act," pace Holland, would be to deconstruct rather than reinscribe the binary between life and death, to resist the racist and heterosexist disavowal of finitude. That Americanist literary criticism on the subject of mortality remains implicated in the larger cultural disavowal of dying suggests that we ought to reassess our critical energies, particularly as these powers are enlisted to address how American political ideology produces the "death" of racial and sexual others. Indeed, I would argue that such criticism remains invested - despite all claims to the contrary - in an American exceptionalist project. American exceptionalism names, in part, a fetishization of novelty and futurity that initially defined America against an ostensibly decaying and moribund Europe. As David Noble has argued, the doctrine of exceptionalism excluded America from "the human experience of birth, death, and rebirth" by figuring Europe in terms of time and America in terms of timeless space." If, as George Berkeley put it, America is "time's noblest offspring," history gives birth to its final progeny in order that the latter might escape time altogether. America thus becomes eternally present while "Europe breeds in her decay." If the "new world" qua new must deny mortality, then reanimating the excluded from within the terms of a dialectical reversal renews rather than dismantles the American exceptionalist project. Challenging the ideology of American exceptionalism is particularly crucial for a post-9/11 politics that aims to resist the transformation of American exposure to injury and death into a newly reconsolidated sense of innocence and immortality. As Donald Pease has argued, 9/11 transformed "virgin land" into "ground zero," effecting an ideological shift from a "secured innocent nation to a wounded, insecure emergency state."16 Drawing from the work of Giorgio Agamben. Pease describes the emergency state as a nation that - by exempting itself from its own democratic rules of free speech, due process, and above all, the rules of war - marks a division between those whom the state protects from injury and those whom the state is free to injure and kill with impunity (13). The reduction of the Arab other to that which cannot be killed because it is already dead works to cover over the wound that ground zero opens up under the surface of virgin land. The emergency state (or what Agamben calls the "state of exception") thus also names a nation that attempts to except itself from the universal condition of mortality. As Bauman notes, "if mortality and transience are the norm among humans, durability may be attained only as an exception" (67, his emphasis).

#### The alternative is to reject the Affirmative-Questioning American exceptionalism is key to understanding our place in the world- rejection is key to more productive politics

Walt 2011[Stephen M. Walt, an FP contributing editor, is Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international affairs at Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government NOVEMBER 2011, Foreign Policy, “The Myth of American Exceptionalism” http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/10/11/the\_myth\_of\_american\_exceptionalism]

Most statements of "American exceptionalism" presume that America's values, political system, and history are unique and worthy of universal admiration. They also imply that the United States is both destined and entitled to play a distinct and positive role on the world stage.¶ The only thing wrong with this self-congratulatory portrait of America's global role is that it is mostly a myth. Although the United States possesses certain unique qualities -- from high levels of religiosity to a political culture that privileges individual freedom -- the conduct of U.S. foreign policy has been determined primarily by its relative power and by the inherently competitive nature of international politics. By focusing on their supposedly exceptional qualities, Americans blind themselves to the ways that they are a lot like everyone else.¶ This unchallenged faith in American exceptionalism makes it harder for Americans to understand why others are less enthusiastic about U.S. dominance, often alarmed by U.S. policies, and frequently irritated by what they see as U.S. hypocrisy, whether the subject is possession of nuclear weapons, conformity with international law, or America's tendency to condemn the conduct of others while ignoring its own failings. Ironically, U.S. foreign policy would probably be more effective if Americans were less convinced of their own unique virtues and less eager to proclaim them.¶ What we need, in short, is a more realistic and critical assessment of America's true character and contributions. In that spirit, I offer here the Top 5 Myths about American Exceptionalism.

### Coal Adv

#### Its barely cleaner than coal

Barton 11 (Charles Barton, Nuclear Green, “No Help with Global Warming: Wind and gas,” 1/29/11) <http://nucleargreen.blogspot.com/2011/01/no-help-with-global-warming-wind-and.html>

Advocates for natural gas routinely … 9,000 times higher than previously reported.

When all these emissions are counted, gas may be as little as 25 percent cleaner than coal, or perhaps even less.¶ If that were not bad enough,¶ roughly half of the 1,600 gas-fired power plants in the United States operate at the lowest end of the efficiency spectrum. And even before the EPA sharply revised its data, these plants were only 32 percent cleaner than coal, . . . Now that the EPA has doubled its emissions estimates, the advantages are slimmer still. Based on the new numbers, the median gas-powered plant in the United States is just 40 percent cleaner than coal, according to calculations ProPublica made . . . Those 800 inefficient plants offer only a 25 percent improvement.¶ Other scientists say the pollution gap between gas and coal could shrink even more. That’s in part because the primary pollutant from natural gas, methane, is far more potent than other greenhouse gases, and scientists are still trying to understand its effect on the climate—and because it continues to be difficult to measure exactly how much methane is being emitted.¶ It is far from clear that Natural Gas is the panasia for global warming. Indeed it may turn out to be another energy bridge to no where if we rely on it too much.

#### Relying on natural gas still emits too much CO2 and causes rollback to coal

Barton 9 (Charles Barton, Nuclear Green, “Greenpeace's [r]evolutionary energy failure: Part I,” 3/13/9) <http://nucleargreen.blogspot.com/2009/03/we-live-in-era-of-confusion.html>

Finally we ought to consider the use of natural gas in the [r]evolution energy system. [R]evolution supports the use of combined heat and power cogeneration systems. I personally think that natural gas combined cycle generators represent a far more efficient use of natural gas. Combined cycle generators uses the heat of gases exiting the turbine's exhaust to heat a boiler. Steam from the boiler powers a steam turbine which is connected to a generator. The combined cycle systems have impressive efficiency. We hear claims about how efficient Combined Heat and Power systems are, but I live in Texas where it would be nice if someone could build a similar system for air conditioning. Combined heat and power systems only are efficient if you need heating, and you certainly don't need heating year round. When you don't need heating you simply get your gas turbine generator efficiency from your CHiPs plant.¶ The whole problem with natural gas can be summed up with two words: carbon dioxide. Even though we might use natural gas more efficiently, it is still a carbon based fossil fuel, and when we burn it, we increase the CO2 concentration in the atmosphere. There are other issues. Natural gas is becoming more expensive to extract. Thus even when used efficiently, natural gas is regarded as a high cost fuel, and natural gas generators are usually treated as peak reserve power sources because utilities can charge more for peak power. Natural gas generating systems have low capital cost, but high fuel costs. Natural gas generators are also useful as load followers. This undoubtedly has a lot to do with why [r]evolution sees as many natural gas generators producing electricity in 2040 as were producing electricity. Grid instability caused by the intermittency of solar and wind generating sources has to be controlled, in order to keep the grid from constantly crashing. Gas turbines have enough flexibility to handle the load stabilizing task on a renewables dominated grid. Unfortunately we cannot speak of such a grid as a post carbon grid, since the [r]evolution grid will be still dependent on the burning of carbon based fuel in 2040. presumably after 2040 electricity from non-intermittent renewable sources - hydro, biomass, and geothermal - will replace replace natural gas, but this assumes that biomass and geothermal will be ready provide large amounts of reliable electricity in a generation. This is a risk of the [r]evolution plan, and quite frankly the odds at present run heavily against biomass, and geothermal, while hydro is not envisioned to expand enough to pick up the slack if biomass and geothermal fail to live up to the expectations which the [r]evolution plan places upon them.¶ Given the likely failure of biomass and geothermal technologies, carbon emitting natural gas will be required to maintain grid stability after 2040. What happens when natural gas begins to run out? The answer is simple, the [r]evolution grid would revert to coal fired generating facilities to provide the grid with the stability! That is right folks, the [r]evolution plan might not get rid of coal long term.

#### Most recent economic analyses project growth in renewable energy

Bossong 12 – (7/5/12, citing Maria van der Hoeven, executive director of the International Energy Agency, and a recent report from the IEA, Medium-Term Renewable Energy Market Report 2012, Kenneth, Executive Director of the SUN DAY Campaign. The SUN DAY Campaign is a non-profit research and educational organization founded in 1993 to promote sustainable energy technologies as cost-effective alternatives to nuclear power and fossil fuels, “IEA sees renewable energy growth accelerating over next 5 years,” [http://www.iea.org/newsroomandevents/pressreleases/2012/july/name,28200,en.html](http://www.iea.org/newsroomandevents/pressreleases/2012/july/name%2C28200%2Cen.html))

Renewable power generation is expected to continue its rapid growth over the next five years, according to a new report from the International Energy Agency (IEA) that acknowledges the coming-of-age of the renewable energy sector. The report says that despite economic uncertainties in many countries, global power generation from hydropower, solar, wind and other renewable sources is projected to increase by more than 40% to almost 6 400 terawatt hours (TWh) – or roughly one-and-a-half times current electricity production in the United States.¶ The study, released today, marks the first time the IEA has devoted a medium-term report to renewable power sources, a recognition of the dynamic and increasing role of renewable energy in the global power mix. The study examines in detail 15 key markets for renewable energy, which currently represent about 80% of renewable generation, while identifying and characterising developments that may emerge in other important markets. It completes a series of IEA medium-term market reports also featuring oil, natural gas and coal. Like the others, it presents a forecast of global developments and detailed country projections over the next five years.¶ The new study, Medium-Term Renewable Energy Market Report 2012, says that renewable electricity generation should expand by 1 840 TWh between 2011 and 2017, almost 60% above the 1 160 TWh growth registered between 2005 and 2011. Renewable generation will increasingly shift from the OECD to new markets, with non-OECD countries accounting for two-thirds of this growth. Of the 710 GW of new global renewable electricity capacity expected, China accounts for almost 40%. Significant deployment is also expected in the United States, India, Germany and Brazil, among others.¶ This growth is underpinned by the maturing of a portfolio of renewable energy technologies, in large part due to supportive policy and market frameworks in OECD countries. However, rapidly increasing electricity demand and energy security needs in recent years have been spurring deployment in many emerging markets – both large and small. These new deployment opportunities are creating a virtuous cycle of improved global competition and cost reductions.¶ “Renewable energy is expanding rapidly as technologies mature, with deployment transitioning from support-driven markets to new and potentially more competitive segments in many countries,” IEA Executive Director Maria van der Hoeven said during today’s launch. “Given the emergence of a portfolio of renewable sources as a crucial pillar of the global energy mix, market stakeholders need a clear understanding of the major drivers and barriers to renewable deployment. Based on these factors, this report forecasts global renewable development and, in so doing, provides a key benchmark for both public and private decision makers.”

#### Unconventional gas will stop renewable energy in its tracks

Harvey 12 – (5/29/12, citing Fatih Birol, chief economist for the International Energy Agency, and Maria van der Hoeven, executive director of the IEA, Fiona, environmental correspondent, The Guardian, “'Golden age of gas' threatens renewable energy, IEA warns,” <http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2012/may/29/gas-boom-renewables-agency-warns>)

A "golden age of gas" spurred by a tripling of shale gas from fracking and other sources of unconventional gas by 2035 will stop renewable energy in its tracks if governments don't take action, the International Energy Agency has warned.¶ Gas is now relatively abundant in some regions, thanks to the massive expansion of hydraulic fracturing – fracking – for shale gas, and in some areas the price of the fuel has fallen. The result is a threat to renewable energy, which is by comparison more expensive, in part because the greenhouse gas emissions from fossil fuels are still not taken into account in the price of energy.¶ Fatih Birol, chief economist for the IEA, said the threat to renewables was plain: "Renewable energy may be the victim of cheap gas prices if governments do not stick to their renewable support schemes."¶ Maria van der Hoeven, executive director of the IEA, told a conference in London: "Policy measures by governments for renewable energy have to be there for years to come, as it is not always as cost-effective as it could be."¶ Shale gas fracking – by which dense shale rocks are blasted apart under high pressure jets of water, sand and chemicals in order to release tiny bubbles of methane trapped inside them – was virtually unknown less than ten years ago, but has rapidly become commonplace. In places like the US, the rising price of energy has made such practices economically worthwhile.¶ On current trends, according to the IEA, the world is set for far more global warming than the 2C that scientists say is the limit of safety, beyond which climate change is likely to become catastrophic and irreversible. "A golden age for gas is not necessarily a golden age for the climate," warned Birol.¶ The IEA report comes as the Guardian revealed that gas has been rebranded in secret documents as a form of green energy by the EU.¶ Gas produces only about half of the carbon emissions of coal when burnt, which has led some industry lobbyists to attempt to rebrand it as a "clean" or "low-carbon" fuel. But its effect on the climate is less clear-cut than the direct comparison with coal would suggest.¶ In the US, gas-fired power stations have taken over in some areas from coal-fired power, reducing the nominal carbon emissions from US power stations. But that does not necessarily equate to a global cut in emissions.¶ Last year, the consumption of coal in Europe rose by 6%, according to Birol, which was a result of an excess of cheap coal on the market because of less consumption in the US, while the price on carbon emissions under the EU's emissions trading scheme – supposed to discourage coal – was too low to have any effect. That rise in coal consumption will have increased emissions in the EU, though the data has not yet been fully collected.¶ This example shows that gas can simply displace emissions rather than cut them altogether, according to Birol. "Gas cannot solve climate change – we need renewable energy," he told the Guardian.

#### Clean tech solves warming

Buczynski 12 – (6/14/12, citing a recent International Energy Agency report “Energy Technology Perspectives 2012 Pathways to a Clean Energy System,” and Maria van der Hoeven, executive director of the IEA, Beth, “CLEAN ENERGY’S CHANCE TO SLOW CLIMATE CHANGE FADING FAST,” <http://revmodo.com/2012/06/14/clean-energys-chance-to-slow-climate-change-fading-fast/>)

A recent report from the International Energy Agency (IEA) found that there is indeed a solution that would allow us to limit global average temperature increase to 2°C and thus prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the Earth’s climate system. But don’t celebrate just yet. Achieving this goal requires a radical transformation of the global energy network and the end of centralized fossil fuel generation.¶ Never has the phrase “easier said than done” been more appropriate.¶ In a 68-page document titled Energy Perspectives 2012, the IEA examines the status of technology development, the alternatives, the state of policy support and R&D, and various scenarios that could give the world the best chance of avoiding dangerous climate change.¶ In order to meet the 2°C goal, the IEA says it’s absolutely essential to establish more flexible energy generation and distribution systems, so that at least 50 percent of the world’s electricity is provided by renewables by the middle of the century. In order for this to happen, global investments in what IEA sees as critical technologies – carbon capture and storage, solar thermal, and offshore wind – must double by 2020.¶ Since all three of those technologies are already in use around the world, we know it’s possible to achieve this ambitious goal. As the report points out, however, the issue holding everything back is money. Even though the switch to decentralized, clean energy technologies would be costly, they’re merely a drop in the bucket compared to what we’re destined to spend extracting, refining, burning, and cleaning up after fossil fuels.

#### US focus on natural gas destroys international climate talks

Colman 12 – (7/12/12, quoting Michael Levi, PhD in war studies from Queens University, David M. Rubenstein senior fellow for energy and environment at the Council on Foreign Relations, director of the CFRs program on energy security and climate change and project director for the Council-sponsored Independent Task Force on global warming, Zach, E2, The Hill’s energy blog, “Natural-gas boom could isolate US on climate change,” <http://thehill.com/blogs/e2-wire/e2-wire/237601-natural-gas-boom-could-hurt-us-climate-change-efforts>)

The domestic national-gas boom might thin the ranks of climate change advocates and put the United States at odds with the international community on the issue, an expert said Thursday. America's insistence that natural gas will play an important role in easing the effects of climate change runs counter to European views and will likely invite “friction,” Michael Levi, program director on energy security and climate change with the Council on Foreign Relations, said during a discussion hosted by the New America Foundation. He said Europeans view natural gas as a dirty energy source. That could isolate the United States in international climate talks, Levi said. “For the most part, people in the United States who care about climate change think that natural gas is good news,” Levi said. “That is not the view in Europe. In Europe, natural gas is generally seen as a bad thing for climate change and a bad direction for the climate. On the international level, that will put us in some problems.” Natural gas emits less carbon dioxide than oil or coal when burned as an energy source. But some environmentalists fear that emissions of methane -- a potent greenhouse gas -- at well sites could erode the climate benefits of the fuel. Climate change has garnered more attention in recent weeks as abnormal weather — including droughts, fires, windstorms and record temperatures — sweeps the country. Department of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano last week said there could be a link between the extreme weather and climate change. The expansion of natural gas might also cause environmentalists most concerned about resource scarcity to drop from a coalition of groups that push for climate change policies, he said. “If that piece of the coalition that wants climate policy in place vanishes because of this sense of abundance, then I think it becomes more difficult to put good climate policy in place,” Levi said.

#### Continued US participation in climate talks is key to US-EU relations EVEN IF no agreement is reached – the brink is now.

Legge 11 – (11/29/11, Thomas, senior program officer for the German Marshall Fund’s Climate & Energy Program, formerly worked on environmental policy for Chatham House (the Royal Institute of International Affairs) in London; the Centre for European Policy Studies in Brussels, Belgium; and Comhar – Sustainable Development Council, an advisory body to the Irish Government, “Using Durban to Bridge the Transatlantic Climate Divide,” <http://blog.gmfus.org/2011/11/29/using-durban-to-bridge-the-transatlantic-climate-divide/>

While the United States may think that the EU has tied itself to a sinking ship, Europeans visiting the United States express exasperation at the U.S. failure to grapple with climate change and at the prominence afforded to pundits who dispute the scientific consensus on climate change. It is common to hear European officials suggest that it is time for Europe to look elsewhere and focus on building cooperation with developing countries. But it would be a grave mistake to give up on the United States. The two continents, working together, have the political and financial capacity to drive global change through policy leadership and the market effect of their domestic policies. Disagreement threatens to hinder international action when there is no time left for delay, and to sour transatlantic relations, as seen in the brewing dispute over the inclusion of U.S. airlines in the EU Emissions Trading System beginning in 2012. In Durban, the EU and the United States will probably manage to avoid an acrimonious falling-out. Memories of the rift in transatlantic relations following George W. Bush’s decision to withdraw from the Kyoto Protocol in early 2001 are still raw. The EU is sympathetic to the domestic political constraints that U.S. President Barack Obama faces and the real actions that his administration is advancing, such as new regulations to control pollution from power stations and to improve efficiency standards in automobiles. Whatever deal is struck in Durban, it will probably be enough to allow the Kyoto Protocol to continue in some form without forcing the United States to denounce the agreement. But outside the negotiations, Europe has a good story to tell about its response to climate change, and it needs to do a better job at persuading the United States to partner with it on this enterprise. In European capitals, policymakers are busy with plans to build new renewable electricity generating capacity, transform the electricity grid to carry the power, and train a whole generation of new engineers who can operate it all. The European Commission is preparing to publish a new “roadmap” for a low-carbon energy system by 2050, the latest in a series of policy statements and regulations since 2008 that are slowly accumulating momentum that could take the EU on a low-carbon trajectory. No conversation on anything like this scale is happening in the United States, nor is one expected until at least after next year’s presidential election. The United States holds that international treaties like the Kyoto Protocol are less relevant than action on the ground. The EU thinks that such action on the ground is a result of the downward pressure of international commitments. Surely there is room to agree here on the outcomes, if not the cause? If the United States were to embark on an ambitious plan of reducing its emissions, and to lead international efforts to imitate it, the EU would be quick to agree that a treaty would be superfluous to this end.

#### US EU relations solve global nuclear war and accidents

Hamilton and Burwell 09 – (2009, Daniel, PhD in American foreign policy from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, Executive Director of the Center for Transatlantic Relations; Executive Director of the American Consortium on EU Studies; Austrian Marshall Plan Foundation Research Professor, and Frances, PhD in Government and Politics from UMD, Atlantic Council vice president, and director of the Program on Transatlantic Relations at the Atlantic Council, former executive director of the Center for International and Security Studies at the University of Maryland, “Shoulder to Shoulder: Forging a Strategic U.S.-EU Partnership,” <http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/wcm/connect/30ce96004082f3dab155bf5e01ac4adf/shoulder_to_shoulder_strategic_US_UE_partnership.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CACHEID=30ce96004082f3dab155bf5e01ac4adf>)

The world that created the transatlantic partnership is fading fast. 1 If the U.S.-European relationship is to be a progressive force in the world to come, **Americans and Europeans must urgently build a more strategic partnership** that is more effective in dealing with new partners and addressing transformations occurring all around them. It is a moment of opportunity -- to use or to lose. There is much that is positive about this new world rising. For the first time in human history, most people on this planet live under governments of their own choosing. Revolutions in science, technology, transportation, and communications are improving lives, freeing minds, and connecting continents. A rising global middle class enjoys a level of economic prosperity and social security never before imagined. More people have been lifted out of poverty in the last twenty years than in all of human history. The Great Powers are at peace. Too many, however, have not shared in these gains; for them change has simply meant disruption and uncertainty. While some countries are more prosperous, stable, and democratic than ever, others struggle with repression, crime, resource scarcities, environmental degradation, religious strife, ethnic divides, and violent conflicts. In an increasingly interconnected world, conflicts that once might have remained local disputes can have global impact. Unstable and ungoverned regions of the world pose dangers for neighbors and a setting for broader problems of terrorism, poverty and despair. Such disruptive forces can also ripple outward to threaten the security and livelihoods of many others. Individuals seeking everything from economic opportunity to personal safety have created massive international migration flows, causing serious dislocations in transit and recipient countries alike. Moreover, the potential of our young century has been stunted by the deepest recession in generations. While the U.S. and Europe still account for more than half of the global economy, the financial crisis has revealed shortcomings both in their economies and in their management of the international economic system. Within the next decade, the world's emerging economies are expected to generate more than half of the world’s output. Yet they too have been hurt by the financial crisis. Developing countries have seen foreign capital dry up, export markets shrivel, and currencies, banks and stock markets weaken. Despite the global economic downturn, connections between continents will continue to grow. **Globalization has** brought large gains in terms of trade and inflows of capital, greater technological diffusion and higher growth. But it has also **enabled dark**er **forces,** including **terrorism,** organized **crime, and radical ideologies, to exacerbate regional tensions and transnational threats and to fuel competition and instability. The technology** and knowledge **to make** and deliver **agents of mass destruction is proliferating** among some of the most ruthless factions and regimes on earth. The Cold War threat of global nuclear war has gone down, but **the risk of a nuclear disaster has gone up. Scientific advances have enhanced biology’s potential for both beneficence and malevolence.** The ability of individuals and groups to employ destructive power will continue, as governments struggle to meet the challenge of networks that move freely across borders. Pressures facing societies and governments are only likely to increase. **Even the most optimistic scenarios for emissions reductions to tackle climate change will require significant measures to cope** with desertification, catastrophic weather events, flooding, greater humanitarian crises, large-scale migration of people, and other related consequences. The International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) estimates that by 2020, up to 250 million Africans could face starvation and malnutrition due to lack of fresh water supplies, lower crop yields, and drought. Mega-delta regions throughout Asia will face huge geopolitical challenges from climate-induced migration. 2 In this new world, the global has become local. Our well-being is increasingly influenced by flows of people, money and weapons, goods and services, technology, toxins and terror, drugs and disease. We characterize these phenomena as "global," but their impact is local. They are unprecedented in their range, scope and speed. They offer untold promise and terrible danger. They are impersonal forces with very personal consequences. As a result, “human” security has become integral to “national” security. The very networks that have enabled globalization bring these dangers closer and make our societies more vulnerable to disruption. The networks themselves are prone to catastrophic disruption, either through aggressive action or because of the sheer complexity of the technology. Yet, these networks remain essential sinews of the global economy and of daily communications. As a result, they require protection. Just as governments used to protect their territories, so they must now protect the networks that connect them and their citizens with the rest of the world. Any truly transformative definition of security must go beyond territorial integrity to include protecting society’s critical functions, the networks that sustain them, and the connections those networks bring with other societies. The local has also become global. Many of our citizens worry that a job gained abroad means a job lost at home, that their hard-won prosperity could simply slip away. They are anxious about the pace of global change, about their livelihoods, about their future. They worry that their way of life is at the mercy of distant events. These concerns are real, widespread, and legitimate. Yet domestic renewal cannot come at the expense of our international engagement. The affairs of the world are too deeply entrenched in our domestic lives for us to ignore global developments while concentrating on problems at home. Domestic renewal, in fact, requires our active international engagement – together. The Need for a 21 st Century Transatlantic Partnership **Some argue that** with the Cold War over and new powers rising, **the transatlantic partnership** has had its day. The values and interests of Europeans and Americans have diverged, it **is** said, and many of our institutions are **of little relevance to today’s challenges.** We disagree. Our partnership remains as vital as in the past, but now we must focus on a new agenda. **The new world rising compels us**, urgently, **to reposition our partnership to meet 21st century challenges**, and to improve the tools at our disposal. In recent years, Europeans and Americans have differed on the nature of some of these challenges and how best to confront them. Such differences can be powerful. But the history of European-American relations has often been the history of difference. Merely asserting difference or **reciting lists of tough issues** does not make the case for estrangement. It **makes the case for more effective partnership.**

### Heg Adv

#### No exports to get leverage

Jordan, 12 OurEnergyPolicy.org director

(Matthew, Enthusiasm and Concern over Natural Gas Exports," OurEnergyPolicy.org, 6-8-12, www.ourenergypolicy.org/enthusiasm-and-concern-over-natural-gas-exports/, accessed 8-16-12 CR

An interesting update on this issue: Analysts are predicting that industrial lobbying could lead to a cap on U.S. natural gas exports.¶ Jayesh Parmar of Baringa told Reuters, “There is a lot of lobbying in the U.S. to limit LNG exports and to instead use the gas to allow the domestic industry to benefit from low energy prices.”¶ Political risk consultancy Eurasia Group recently wrote “Resource nationalism is the biggest political risk to U.S. LNG (exports), with many opponents to exports concerned about the impact on domestic natural gas prices.”

#### Exporting natural gas doesn’t give us leverage- others will just drill more

Levi, 12 CFR energy senior fellow (Michael, PhD in war studies from the University of London, Council on Foreign Relations Energy and the Environment senior fellow, Program on Energy Security and Climate Change director, "A Strategy for U.S. Natural Gas Exports," June, www.brookings.edu//media/research/files/papers/2012/6/13%20exports%20levi/06\_exports\_levi.pdf, accessed 8-16-12 CR

It is far from clear that all or even most of this export volume ¶ would be used even if it were approved. A recent MIT study ¶ looked at nine scenarios for U.S. and world natural gas markets; ¶ none of them led to the emergence of significant U.S. natural ¶ gas exports, in large part because other lower cost producers ¶ undercut prices offered by the United States in distant markets ¶ (MIT 2011). Other forces, discussed in Chapter 2, could also ¶ lead global natural gas prices to converge even without U.S. ¶ exports, removing opportunities for economically attractive ¶ U.S. LNG sales.

#### U.S. attempts to dominate the natural gas market causes a natural-gas OPEC to be formed – ruins economy

Anne Korin, an adviser to the U.S. Energy Security Council and co-director of the Institute for the Analysis of Global Security, an energy-security think tank, “Should the U.S. Export Natural Gas?,” Wall Street Journal, September 13, 2012, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390444226904577561300198957854.html>, accessed 9-21-2012.

But as LNG plays a larger part in international natural-gas trading and the commodity becomes fungible, the other gas giants—Russia, Iran, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates—will have every incentive to concretize their discussions on forming an OPEC-like natural-gas cartel. They'll be able to restrict supply to the market and counterbalance the U.S.¶ That will drive the newly global natural-gas price—and thus prices in the U.S.—higher than it would have gone otherwise. That will certainly benefit those who own and sell the gas, but through higher electricity and chemical prices, it would overall be a drain on the economy.

#### Heg doesn’t solve war

Barbara Conry (former associate policy analyst, was a public relations consultant at Hensley Segal Rentschler and an expert on security issues in the Middle East, Western Europe, and Central Asia at the CATO Institute) and Charles V. Pena (Senior Fellow at the Independent Institute as well as a senior fellow with the Coalition for a Realistic Foreign Policy, and an adviser on the Straus Military Reform Project at the CATO Institute) 2003 “47. US Security Strategy” CATO Handbook for Congress, http://www.cato.org/pubs/handbook/hb108/hb108-47.pdf

Another rationale for attempting to manage global security is that a world without U.S. hegemony would soon degenerate into a tangle of chaos and instability, in which weapons proliferation, genocide, terrorism, and other offensive activities would be rampant. Prophets of such a development hint that if the United States fails to exercise robust political and military leadership today, the world is condemned to repeat the biggest mistakes of the 20th century—or perhaps do something even worse. Such thinking is seriously flawed. First, instability in the international system is nothing new, and most episodes do not affect U.S. vital interests. Furthermore, to assert that U.S. global leadership can stave off otherwise inevitable global chaos vastly overstates the power of any single country to influence world events. Indeed, many of the problems that plague the world today, such as civil wars and ethnic strife, are largely impervious to external solutions. There is little to back up an assertion that only Washington’s management of international security can save the world from political, economic, or military conflagration.

### Econ Adv

#### Manufacturing is strengthening- industry reports

Schmidt 10-4 [Mike Schmidt, Associate Editor, Manufacturing Business Technology 10-4-2012 Manufacturing Business Technology Magazine http://www.mbtmag.com/articles/2012/10/ism-manufacturing-back-track]

The manufacturing sector is back on track – at least for now.¶ Economic activity in the manufacturing sector expanded in September following three straight months of slight contraction, according to the latest Manufacturing ISM Report on Business.¶ The September PMI registered 51.5 percent, an increase of 1.9 percentage points when compared to the August reading of 49.6 percent. A reading above 50 percent indicates the manufacturing economy is expanding, while a reading below 50 percent means it is contracting. To add to the good news, the overall economy grew for the 40th consecutive month. A reading above 42.6 percent generally indicates expansion in this area.¶ It’s a welcome sight, but there are no assurances the recent turnaround will last.¶ “I’m not ready to get really excited about a new direction or significant change, but certainly we can hope it hangs in there” says Brad Holcomb, CPSM, CPSD, chair of the Institute for Supply Management Manufacturing Business Survey Committee.¶ “We’re making a good showing,” he adds, noting that an uptick in new orders is driving growth in the manufacturing sector.¶ New Orders¶ ISM’s New Orders Index registered 52.3 percent in September, an increase of 5.2 percentage points when compared to the August reading of 47.1 percent. Prior to September, new orders had contracted for three consecutive months.¶ “It’s a reflection of consumer activity and consumer confidence, so I’m pleasantly surprised to see that 5.2 percentage-point bump” says Holcomb.¶ Employment¶ There was also good news to be found in the most recent performance of the ISM Employment Index. After registering 56.6 percent in June, the Index dropped to just 51.6 percent in August. However, it rebounded to 54.7 in September – the 36th straight month of growth in this area.¶ “When I see employment going up like that it represents some additional optimism on the part of manufacturing to make sure there is good, solid and growing employment in advance of those new orders,” says Holcomb.

#### Most reliable surveys say job growth now

Lee 10-5 [Don Lee 10-5-2012 LA Times “Unemployment falls sharply to 7.8%, a 3 1/2-year low” http://www.latimes.com/business/money/la-fi-mo-economy-jobs-20121005,0,3919543.story]

The nation's unemployment rate fell sharply to 7.8% in September, the lowest level since January 2009 when President Obama took office. And the government reported Friday that job growth this summer was stronger than previously estimated.¶ Overall, the economy added 114,000 jobs in September, in line with analysts' expectations. Job growth for August was revised up to 142,000 from 96,000; and the new-jobs figure for July was bumped up to 181,000, from 141,000 previously estimated.¶ Far more surprising was the dramatic 0.3 percentage point decline in the jobless rate, which all year long had been hovering between 8.1% and 8.3%. The big drop would seem out of sync with the modest job gains last month.¶ But the explanation is that the unemployment figure is based on a different survey than the one that produces the monthly payroll job tally. The job growth numbers come from a survey of employers and is considered more reliable month to month.

#### QE3 will stabilize the economy

Pesek 10-4 [William Pesek is based in Tokyo and writes on economics, markets and politics throughout the Asia-Pacific region. His journalism awards include the 2010 Society of American Business Editors and Writers prize for commentary. 10-4-2012 Bloomberg “Bernanke’s QE3 Will Turn Out Better Than Japan’s” http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-10-04/bernanke-s-qe3-will-turn-out-better-than-japan-s-william-pesek.html]

The issue for Bernanke is to look where quantitative easing failed first. He did, of course, even before the practice formally existed. The Fed chairman made his mark at Princeton University with papers such as “Japanese Monetary Policy: A Case of Self-Induced Paralysis?” in 1999. He applied those lessons to America’s own brush with a depression in 2008.¶ Fresh Insights¶ Fresh insights can be gleaned from Japan. The notion that buying financial assets from banks and other private institutions adds oomph to monetary policy was born in the country 11 years ago. It has been a flop. Just ask Japan’s newest finance minister, the fifth to hold the job in three years. I debated whether even to mention Koriki Jojima’s name here. You have to wonder how long this one will be around.¶ It is no mystery why finance czars keep falling on their proverbial swords: The economy is no healthier than it was in 2001, when Japan’s central bank invented “QE.” Why? Because the BOJ never fully embraced QE as it was originally envisioned.¶ The main criticism of former BOJ Governor Masaru Hayami, who held the job from 1998 to 2003, was that he didn’t pump enough yen into the economy to generate inflation and growth. In reality, his mistake was that he didn’t take lenders’ toxic assets onto the BOJ’s books so banks could return to the job of credit creation. Hayami focused, instead, on relatively conventional open-market operations to lower interest rates. The amount of liquidity increased, but confidence among bankers didn’t.¶ “It’s like filling a bath with the plug out,” says Nicholas Smith, a strategist at CLSA Asia-Pacific Markets Ltd. in Tokyo.¶ Hayami’s successor, Toshihiko Fukui (2003-2008), made the BOJ’s drain even wider. Under him, broad money growth faltered and the yen surged. And let’s not forget Fukui’s ill-fated decision in 2006 to begin raising interest rates. The only time a recent central banker erred worse was when ECB President Jean- Claude Trichet boosted borrowing costs in 2008 as markets were crashing. Shirakawa’s first job when he took over was to drive interest rates back to zero.¶ Bernanke’ QE program has a much better chance of working because it relies on boosting consumption by lifting asset prices, particularly for housing. As home values stabilize, so will Americans’ perceptions of their economic plight. The trouble is that each QE dose loses its effectiveness unless it is carefully calibrated to reach new asset classes.

#### Natural gas not key to manufacturing – affected sectors are inconsequential

Michael A. Levi, David M. Rubenstein Senior Fellow for Energy and the Environment and Director of the Program on Energy Security and Climate Change, “Energy and U.S. Manufacturing: Five Things to Think About,” Council on Foreign Relations, May 16, 2012, <http://blogs.cfr.org/levi/2012/05/16/energy-and-u-s-manufacturing-five-things-to-think-about/>, accessed 9-18-2012.

The boom in U.S. oil and gas production has sparked talk of a manufacturing renaissance. I mentioned that somewhat skeptically last week in the context of a much broader piece on the excitement surrounding surging U.S. oil and gas output. I want to drill down on five important issues here. Some of this thinking is preliminary, so as always, feedback is most welcome.¶ Energy is of marginal importance to most manufacturing.¶ Most U.S. manufacturing is not energy intensive. Joe Aldy and Billy Pizer reported in a 2009 paper that only one tenth of U.S. manufacturing involved energy costs exceeding five percent of the total value of shipments. These industries – the most prominent of which are iron and steel, primary aluminum, bulk cement, chemicals, paper, and glass – are what we are talking about when we discuss the potential for an energy-driven manufacturing boom. The size of these sectors would need to grow enormously to have revolutionary consequences for the fate of the U.S. manufacturing sector. Avoiding substantial decline, though, could be more feasible.

#### Econ resilient

Fareed Zakaria (editor of Newsweek International) December 2009 “The Secrets of Stability,” http://www.newsweek.com/id/226425/page/2]

One year ago, the world seemed as if it might be coming apart. The global financial system, which had fueled a great expansion of capitalism and trade across the world, was crumbling. All the certainties of the age of globalization—about the virtues of free markets, trade, and technology—were being called into question. Faith in the American model had collapsed. The financial industry had crumbled. Once-roaring emerging markets like China, India, and Brazil were sinking. Worldwide trade was shrinking to a degree not seen since the 1930s. Pundits whose bearishness had been vindicated predicted we were doomed to a long, painful bust, with cascading failures in sector after sector, country after country. In a widely cited essay that appeared in The Atlantic n this May, Simon Johnson, former chief economist of the International Monetary Fund, wrote: "The conventional wisdom among the elite is still that the current slump 'cannot be as bad as the Great Depression.' This view is wrong. What we face now could, in fact, be worse than the Great Depression." Others predicted that these economic shocks would lead to political instability and violence in the worst-hit countries. At his confirmation hearing in February, the new U.S. director of national intelligence, Adm. Dennis Blair, cautioned the Senate that "the financial crisis and global recession are likely to produce a wave of economic crises in emerging-market nations over the next year." Hillary Clinton endorsed this grim view. And she was hardly alone. Foreign Policy ran a cover story predicting serious unrest in several emerging markets. Of one thing everyone was sure: nothing would ever be the same again. Not the financial industry, not capitalism, not globalization. One year later, how much has the world really changed? Well, Wall Street is home to two fewer investment banks (three, if you count Merrill Lynch). Some regional banks have gone bust. There was some turmoil in Moldova and (entirely unrelated to the financial crisis) in Iran. Severe problems remain, like high unemployment in the West, and we face new problems caused by responses to the crisis—soaring debt and fears of inflation. But overall, things look nothing like they did in the 1930s. The predictions of economic and political collapse have not materialized at all. A key measure of fear and fragility is the ability of poor and unstable countries to borrow money on the debt markets. So consider this: the sovereign bonds of tottering Pakistan have returned 168 percent so far this year. All this doesn't add up to a recovery yet, but it does reflect a return to some level of normalcy. And that rebound has been so rapid that even the shrewdest observers remain puzzled. "The question I have at the back of my head is 'Is that it?' " says Charles Kaye, the co-head of Warburg Pincus. "We had this huge crisis, and now we're back to business as usual?"This revival did not happen because markets managed to stabilize themselves on their own. Rather, governments, having learned the lessons of the Great Depression, were determined not to repeat the same mistakes once this crisis hit. By massively expanding state support for the economy—through central banks and national treasuries—they buffered the worst of the damage.

 (Whether they made new mistakes in the process remains to be seen.) The extensive social safety nets that have been established across the industrialized world also cushioned the pain felt by many. Times are still tough, but things are nowhere near as bad as in the 1930s, when governments played a tiny role in national economies. It's true that the massive state interventions of the past year may be fueling some new bubbles: the cheap cash and government guarantees provided to banks, companies, and consumers have fueled some irrational exuberance in stock and bond markets. Yet these rallies also demonstrate the return of confidence, and confidence is a very powerful economic force. When John Maynard Keynes described his own prescriptions for economic growth, he believed government action could provide only a temporary fix until the real motor of the economy started cranking again—the animal spirits of investors, consumers, and companies seeking risk and profit. Beyond all this, though, I believe there's a fundamental reason why we have not faced global collapse in the last year. It is the same reason that we weathered the stock-market crash of 1987, the recession of 1992, the Asian crisis of 1997, the Russian default of 1998, and the tech-bubble collapse of 2000. The current global economic system is inherently more resilient than we think. The world today is characterized by three major forces for stability, each reinforcing the other and each historical in nature.

# 2NC

## Politics

#### Russia is not aggressive- looking for cooperation

Itar-Tass 2012 [Itar-Tass 28/02/2012 “Experts see no aggressiveness in Putin’s foreign policy article” http://www.itar-tass.com/en/c39/354109.pdf]

Outright criticism of the United States and NATO in the international scene has prompted some analysts to speculate that¶ with Putin’s return to the Kremlin Russia’s foreign policy will get tougher. However, the key idea of most commentaries is¶ this: the national leader defends Russia’s interests in the world arena, and the article is not aggressive, it merely expresses¶ the expectation Russia will be respected. In his article titled Russia and the Changing World Putin says the country will not¶ be isolating itself and wishes to stay open and cooperate with al l other countries in various fields , including the¶ strengthening of universal security, but at the same time it believes it will be impermissible for individual countries and¶ blocks to encroach on state sovereignty.¶ Putin unequivocally accused the United States and NATO of “undermining confidence” and pointed out that “some aspects¶ of their behavior do not fit in with the logic of modern development and rely on the stereotypes of bloc mentality.” Russia, as¶ follows from the article, is most resentful over NATO’s expansion and plans for building a missile defense system in Europe.¶ The United States and NATO, Putin believes, on the pretext of human rights protection has abused the sovereignty of other¶ states in a series of armed conflicts. Moreover, it was protecting human rights “selectively,” while violating the right of¶ masses of other people to life. The events of the ”Arab spring,” and the outcome of the operation in Iraq have brought about¶ a situation where religious extremism is on the rise in the countries involved, and the situation is getting even worse than it¶ had been before external intervention, he said.¶ In his analysis of the West’s participation in the events of the “Arab spring” and its actions in the Middle East in general Putin¶ calls in question whether the aims of the United States and NATO are really ‘noble’. He speculates that the real aims are not¶ the establishment of democracy or the protection of human rights, but “interest in the re-division of markets.” Such foreign¶ interference, whatever noble goals may be used as a cover-up, is confined to actual support for one of the parties to a¶ conflict and to ousting the latter’s rival with the net effect “domination of one force is replaced by a still more aggressive¶ domination of the other,” Putin said.¶ Alongside his critical description of the United States’ foreign policy Putin believes that “in periods of international¶ turbulence close and trusting cooperation by Moscow and Washington is particularly in great demand.” In relations with the¶ United States Russia is prepared for a qualitative breakthrough on the condition “the Americans will be guided in reality by¶ the principles of equitable partnership and mutual respect.”¶ “Putin is contesting the Russian presidency and for that reason he was obliged to formulate Russia’s attitude to a number of¶ fundamental issues very harshly. This article was written not only for the people of Russia. With it the prime minster sends a¶ message to our neighbors, partners and competitors. If the article were written for the sole purpose of maneuvering, it would¶ remain unnoticed, the deputy chairman of the State Duma’s international affairs committee, is quoted by Life News as¶ saying.¶ At the same time Putin not only identified the problems of international community, but proposed ways of handling them,¶ the legislator said. For instance, he not only mentioned our differences over the missile defense issue, but also called for¶ enhancing cooperation, thereby easing the risk of a major international conflict.¶ “This article is a demand for respecting Russia,” the weekly Argumenty I Fakty quotes the general director of the Center forPolitical Information, Alexei Mukhin, as saying. “Putin has not proposed some new foreign policy strategy, he merely stated¶ that at a certain point Russia selected the correct path to follow, and if it continues along it, it will achieve respect. The most¶ important thing is the prime minister declared he is a serious person and does not change his views under the influence of¶ time-serving political considerations.”¶ “There are some nuances, but in general the point of view is clear and stable,” political scientist Fyodor Lukyanov said on¶ the Russian News Service radio station. “I believe that in this article there is nothing offensive or aggressive. It is rather¶ defensive. It describes the world in which Russia will have to exist during his hypothetical presidency as a very dangerous¶ place.”¶ “It is very important the article declares that despite the existing controversies and problems Russia sees the United States¶ as a partner,” the RBC Daily quotes political scientist Alexei Zudin as saying. “Certainly there will be attempts to interpret¶ the foreign policy approaches, declared in that article, as aggressive. I believe that this does not agree with the reality.

#### No aggressive Russia- personnel constraints

Stratfor 2012 [Stratfor August 31, 2012 “The Future of Russia's Military: Part 5” http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/future-russias-military-part-5]

One challenge facing the Kremlin is recruitment. Several factors, including negative demographic trends, have undermined the military's ability to recruit and retain a sufficient number of quality personnel.¶ According to official numbers from the Russian armed forces, the military can currently build an estimated maximum force of 800,000 personnel -- a smaller figure than the 1 million personnel target usually given. In April 2012, the military comprised 160,100 officers, 189,700 contract soldiers and 317,200 conscripts. Taking retention rates and general attrition levels into account, the Russian military needs to conscript around 300,000 people during each of its drafts to maintain target troop levels of 1 million.¶ However, the military has reportedly fallen short of its conscription goals in recent years, with 280,000 Russians inducted in the fall 2010 draft, 218,720 in spring 2011, 135,850 in fall 2011 and 132,000 in spring 2012. An increasing number of violations associated with the draft is thus unsurprising. During the fall 2011 draft, officials who were under pressure to meet even the lowered targets committed some 6,000 violations in the conscription of Russians considered unfit to serve.¶ The conscription problems have forced the military to attempt to recruit higher numbers of contract soldiers by raising salaries and improving living conditions. These efforts require considerable funding, but they will be central to the modernization of the Russian military moving forward.

## Econ Adv

### No Spikes

#### No price spikes – natural gas companies, mild winter, excessive surplus

Larsen Kusick, analyst, “Natural Gas Prices Will Stay Low Longer Than Anyone Expects,” The Growth Stock Wire, March 26, 2012, <http://www.growthstockwire.com/3004/Natural-Gas-Prices-Will-Stay-Low-Longer-Than-Anyone-Expects>, accessed 9-18-2012.

Energy investors need to make a long-term shift in their thinking. ¶ ¶ Last week, the U.S. Energy Information Administration reported natural gas inventories increased for the first time this year. ¶ ¶ By itself, the increase may not seem like a big deal... except that natural gas storage levels are already at record levels for this time of year. ¶ ¶ This is the latest piece of evidence that natural gas prices will likely stay low longer than anyone betting otherwise can stay solvent. ¶ ¶ Let me explain...¶ ¶ Natural gas is a big part of heating homes during the winter months. So as colder weather arrives around late October, demand for natural gas typically moves above production. In other words, we start using enough natural gas to work off the built-up inventory. Then, in the warm months, inventory rises.¶ ¶ This cycle repeats year after year. Except this year, things are out-of-whack.¶ ¶ As most Growth Stock Wire readers already know, natural gas production is skyrocketing. Back in November, I noted that even after double-digit production growth in 2011, natural gas drillers like Range Resources and Cabot Oil were set to increase their natural gas production by 40% to 50% in 2012.¶ ¶ Add to that an unusually mild winter in most of the U.S., and natural gas inventories are at extreme levels.¶ ¶ Last week's inventory report confirmed that the U.S. has 2,380 billion cubic feet of natural gas sitting in storage. That's a record high for this time of year and 47% more than we had in storage a year ago. Put another way, we're just starting the seven-month period when excess natural gas production starts going into storage... and inventories are already way above normal. ¶ ¶ Last week, the Wall Street Journal reported that natural gas storage facilities are at 58% of capacity. It's the first time in five years that the U.S. has been above 44% of capacity in mid-March.¶ ¶ Meanwhile, of course, U.S. natural gas prices are sitting near 10-year lows. ¶ ¶ With no sign of increased demand until next winter, producers are trying to cope by cutting production. As my colleague Frank Curzio noted two months ago, Chesapeake, America's self-described "champion of natural gas," already announced a 50% cut in "dry" gas production. ("Dry" gas is industry-speak for wells that produce natural gas without valuable "liquids" like ethane, propane, and butane.) ¶ ¶ Normally, when production shuts down, supplies fall, and inventories drop... prices rise. But I don't expect that to happen with natural gas... not for a LONG time.¶ ¶ You see, during Chesapeake's quarterly conference call last month, analysts asked why the company had adjusted its financial expectations for 2012 but not 2013. CEO Aubrey McClendon replied, "If the gas market is attractive enough, there's a likelihood that we could produce more gas in 2013 than what we presently have modeled." ¶ ¶ That's just another way of saying, "The instant that natural gas prices go up slightly, we're gonna crank up the rigs and start producing again." ¶ ¶ In short, there's no end in sight to low natural gas prices. Inventories are already at record highs, which creates downward pressure on prices. Meanwhile, producers like Chesapeake have their "finger on the button"... ready to dump more natural gas onto the market if the price rises.¶ ¶ For energy investors, it's critical to focus on companies that produce oil, not just natural gas. And it's a good idea to consider who benefits from long-term low prices. This includes natural gas engine-maker Westport Innovations, "natural gas highway" play Clean Energy Fuels, and natural gas exporters like Cheniere Energy.¶ ¶ There's no sign of this trend changing any time soon. If you're betting on a dramatic recovery in natural gas prices, you're not likely to see them this year... or possibly for years to come. There are much better spots for your money.

### Econ Resil 2NC

#### Econ resilient

Fareed Zakaria (editor of Newsweek International) December 2009 “The Secrets of Stability,” http://www.newsweek.com/id/226425/page/2]

One year ago, the world seemed as if it might be coming apart. The global financial system, which had fueled a great expansion of capitalism and trade across the world, was crumbling. All the certainties of the age of globalization—about the virtues of free markets, trade, and technology—were being called into question. Faith in the American model had collapsed. The financial industry had crumbled. Once-roaring emerging markets like China, India, and Brazil were sinking. Worldwide trade was shrinking to a degree not seen since the 1930s. Pundits whose bearishness had been vindicated predicted we were doomed to a long, painful bust, with cascading failures in sector after sector, country after country. In a widely cited essay that appeared in The Atlantic n this May, Simon Johnson, former chief economist of the International Monetary Fund, wrote: "The conventional wisdom among the elite is still that the current slump 'cannot be as bad as the Great Depression.' This view is wrong. What we face now could, in fact, be worse than the Great Depression." Others predicted that these economic shocks would lead to political instability and violence in the worst-hit countries. At his confirmation hearing in February, the new U.S. director of national intelligence, Adm. Dennis Blair, cautioned the Senate that "the financial crisis and global recession are likely to produce a wave of economic crises in emerging-market nations over the next year." Hillary Clinton endorsed this grim view. And she was hardly alone. Foreign Policy ran a cover story predicting serious unrest in several emerging markets. Of one thing everyone was sure: nothing would ever be the same again. Not the financial industry, not capitalism, not globalization. One year later, how much has the world really changed? Well, Wall Street is home to two fewer investment banks (three, if you count Merrill Lynch). Some regional banks have gone bust. There was some turmoil in Moldova and (entirely unrelated to the financial crisis) in Iran. Severe problems remain, like high unemployment in the West, and we face new problems caused by responses to the crisis—soaring debt and fears of inflation. But overall, things look nothing like they did in the 1930s. The predictions of economic and political collapse have not materialized at all. A key measure of fear and fragility is the ability of poor and unstable countries to borrow money on the debt markets. So consider this: the sovereign bonds of tottering Pakistan have returned 168 percent so far this year. All this doesn't add up to a recovery yet, but it does reflect a return to some level of normalcy. And that rebound has been so rapid that even the shrewdest observers remain puzzled. "The question I have at the back of my head is 'Is that it?' " says Charles Kaye, the co-head of Warburg Pincus. "We had this huge crisis, and now we're back to business as usual?"This revival did not happen because markets managed to stabilize themselves on their own. Rather, governments, having learned the lessons of the Great Depression, were determined not to repeat the same mistakes once this crisis hit. By massively expanding state support for the economy—through central banks and national treasuries—they buffered the worst of the damage.

 (Whether they made new mistakes in the process remains to be seen.) The extensive social safety nets that have been established across the industrialized world also cushioned the pain felt by many. Times are still tough, but things are nowhere near as bad as in the 1930s, when governments played a tiny role in national economies. It's true that the massive state interventions of the past year may be fueling some new bubbles: the cheap cash and government guarantees provided to banks, companies, and consumers have fueled some irrational exuberance in stock and bond markets. Yet these rallies also demonstrate the return of confidence, and confidence is a very powerful economic force. When John Maynard Keynes described his own prescriptions for economic growth, he believed government action could provide only a temporary fix until the real motor of the economy started cranking again—the animal spirits of investors, consumers, and companies seeking risk and profit. Beyond all this, though, I believe there's a fundamental reason why we have not faced global collapse in the last year. It is the same reason that we weathered the stock-market crash of 1987, the recession of 1992, the Asian crisis of 1997, the Russian default of 1998, and the tech-bubble collapse of 2000. The current global economic system is inherently more resilient than we think. The world today is characterized by three major forces for stability, each reinforcing the other and each historical in nature.

#### Economic collapse doesn’t cause war – no causal connection

Thomas P.M. Barnett (senior managing director of Enterra Solutions LLC and a contributing editor/online columnist for Esquire magazine) August 2009 “The New Rules: Security Remains Stable Amid Financial Crisis” http://www.aprodex.com/the-new-rules--security-remains-stable-amid-financial-crisis-398-bl.aspx

When the global financial crisis struck roughly a year ago, the blogosphere was ablaze with all sorts of scary predictions of, and commentary regarding, ensuing conflict and wars -- a rerun of the Great Depression leading to world war, as it were. Now, as global economic news brightens and recovery -- surprisingly led by China and emerging markets -- is the talk of the day, it's interesting to look back over the past year and realize how globalization's first truly worldwide recession has had virtually no impact whatsoever on the international security landscape. None of the more than three-dozen ongoing conflicts listed by GlobalSecurity.org can be clearly attributed to the global recession. Indeed, the last new entry (civil conflict between Hamas and Fatah in the Palestine) predates the economic crisis by a year, and three quarters of the chronic struggles began in the last century. Ditto for the 15 low-intensity conflicts listed by Wikipedia (where the latest entry is the Mexican "drug war" begun in 2006). Certainly, the Russia-Georgia conflict last August was specifically timed, but by most accounts the opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympics was the most important external trigger (followed by the U.S. presidential campaign) for that sudden spike in an almost two-decade long struggle between Georgia and its two breakaway regions. Looking over the various databases, then, we see a most familiar picture: the usual mix of civil conflicts, insurgencies, and liberation-themed terrorist movements. Besides the recent Russia-Georgia dust-up, the only two potential state-on-state wars (North v. South Korea, Israel v. Iran) are both tied to one side acquiring a nuclear weapon capacity -- a process wholly unrelated to global economic trends. And with the United States effectively tied down by its two ongoing major interventions (Iraq and Afghanistan-bleeding-into-Pakistan), our involvement elsewhere around the planet has been quite modest, both leading up to and following the onset of the economic crisis: e.g., the usual counter-drug efforts in Latin America, the usual military exercises with allies across Asia, mixing it up with pirates off Somalia's coast). Everywhere else we find serious instability we pretty much let it burn, occasionally pressing the Chinese -- unsuccessfully -- to do something. Our new Africa Command, for example, hasn't led us to anything beyond advising and training local forces. So, to sum up: \* No significant uptick in mass violence or unrest (remember the smattering of urban riots last year in places like Greece, Moldova and Latvia?); \* The usual frequency maintained in civil conflicts (in all the usual places); \* Not a single state-on-state war directly caused (and no great-power-on-great-power crises even triggered); \* No great improvement or disruption in great-power cooperation regarding the emergence of new nuclear powers (despite all that diplomacy); \* A modest scaling back of international policing efforts by the system's acknowledged Leviathan power (inevitable given the strain); and \* No serious efforts by any rising great power to challenge that Leviathan or supplant its role. (The worst things we can cite are Moscow's occasional deployments of strategic assets to the Western hemisphere and its weak efforts to outbid the United States on basing rights in Kyrgyzstan; but the best include China and India stepping up their aid and investments in Afghanistan and Iraq.) Sure, we've finally seen global defense spending surpass the previous world record set in the late 1980s, but even that's likely to wane given the stress on public budgets created by all this unprecedented "stimulus" spending. If anything, the friendly cooperation on such stimulus packaging was the most notable great-power dynamic caused by the crisis. Can we say that the world has suffered a distinct shift to political radicalism as a result of the economic crisis? Indeed, no. The world's major economies remain governed by center-left or center-right political factions that remain decidedly friendly to both markets and trade. In the short run, there were attempts across the board to insulate economies from immediate damage (in effect, as much protectionism as allowed under current trade rules), but there was no great slide into "trade wars." Instead, the World Trade Organization is functioning as it was designed to function, and regional efforts toward free-trade agreements have not slowed. Can we say Islamic radicalism was inflamed by the economic crisis? If it was, that shift was clearly overwhelmed by the Islamic world's growing disenchantment with the brutality displayed by violent extremist groups such as al-Qaida. And looking forward, austere economic times are just as likely to breed connecting evangelicalism as disconnecting fundamentalism. At the end of the day, the economic crisis did not prove to be sufficiently frightening to provoke major economies into establishing global regulatory schemes, even as it has sparked a spirited -- and much needed, as I argued last week -- discussion of the continuing viability of the U.S. dollar as the world's primary reserve currency. Naturally, plenty of experts and pundits have attached great significance to this debate, seeing in it the beginning of "economic warfare" and the like between "fading" America and "rising" China. And yet, in a world of globally integrated production chains and interconnected financial markets, such "diverging interests" hardly constitute signposts for wars up ahead. Frankly, I don't welcome a world in which America's fiscal profligacy goes undisciplined, so bring it on -- please! Add it all up and it's fair to say that this global financial crisis has proven the great resilience of America's post-World War II international liberal trade order. Do I expect to read any analyses along those lines in the blogosphere any time soon? Absolutely not. I expect the fantastic fear-mongering to proceed apace. That's what the Internet is for.

## Heg Adv

#### International system resilient – no conflict

Christopher Preble (director of foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute) August 2010 “U.S. Military Power: Preeminence for What Purpose?” http://www.cato-at-liberty.org/u-s-military-power-preeminence-for-what-purpose/

Most in Washington still embraces the notion that America is, and forever will be, the world’s indispensable nation. Some scholars, however, questioned the logic of hegemonic stability theory from the very beginning. A number continue to do so today. They advance arguments diametrically at odds with the primacist consensus. Trade routes need not be policed by a single dominant power; the international economy is complex and resilient. Supply disruptions are likely to be temporary, and the costs of mitigating their effects should be borne by those who stand to lose — or gain — the most. Islamic extremists are scary, but hardly comparable to the threat posed by a globe-straddling Soviet Union armed with thousands of nuclear weapons. It is frankly absurd that we spend more today to fight Osama bin Laden and his tiny band of murderous thugs than we spent to face down Joseph Stalin and Chairman Mao. Many factors have contributed to the dramatic decline in the number of wars between nation-states; it is unrealistic to expect that a new spasm of global conflict would erupt if the United States were to modestly refocus its efforts, draw down its military power, and call on other countries to play a larger role in their own defense, and in the security of their respective regions. But while there are credible alternatives to the United States serving in its current dual role as world policeman / armed social worker, the foreign policy establishment in Washington has no interest in exploring them. The people here have grown accustomed to living at the center of the earth, and indeed, of the universe. The tangible benefits of all this military spending flow disproportionately to this tiny corner of the United States while the schlubs in fly-over country pick up the tab.

#### No credible threats now

Doug Bandow (senior fellow at the Cato Institute. He is a former special assistant to President Reagan) January 2010 “Military Spending — For What?” http://www.cato.org/pub\_display.php?pub\_id=11143

The United States dominates the globe militarily. The threats facing America pale compared to its capabilities. Why, then, is Washington spending so much on the military? In 2010 the U.S. will spend roughly $700 billion on the military. This is an increase of 2 percent (after inflation) from the Obama administration's original nonwar defense budget of $534 billion. Despite initial plans for zero growth in defense spending in coming years, there are rumors that the Department of Defense will receive a 2 percent increase in real outlays through 2015. Still, some conservatives want to enshrine a military buildup in a law mandating fixed outlays at 4, 5 or even 6 percent of gross domestic product. Hawks focus on the percentage of GDP going to the military — currently about 4.4 percent — since that figure has fallen over the years. America spends more inflation- adjusted dollars on the military today than at any time since the end of World War II. Figured in 2000 dollars, the U.S. devoted $774.6 billion to the military in 1945, the final year of World War II. In 1953, the final year of the Korean War, military outlay ran to $416.1 billion. Expenditure during the Vietnam War peaked at $421.3 billion in 1968. By contrast, in 2010 — even before the Afghan surge and other unplanned expenditure — the administration expected to spend $517.8 billion. That's more than during the lengthy, but often warm, Cold War. Expenditure as a percentage of GDP has fallen because the U.S. economy has grown. GDP in 2010 (in 2000 dollars) will run to about $11.7 trillion. That is almost twice as much as in 1986, more than three times as much as in 1968, and nearly six times as much as in 1953. Military outlay should be tied to threats, not economic growth. Can anyone credibly claim the military threat facing America is two, three, or six times as great today as during those years? Today the U.S. does not face a significant military threat. As Colin Powell famously declared in 1991 when chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: "I'm running out of enemies. I'm down to Castro and Kim Il Sung." The U.S. has no great power enemies. Relations with China and Russia are at times uneasy, but not confrontational, let alone warlike. Washington is allied with every other industrialized state. America possesses the most sophisticated nuclear arsenal and the most powerful conventional force. Washington's reach exceeds that of Rome and Britain at their respective peaks. Other nations, most notably China, are stirring, but it will take years before they match, let alone overtake, the U.S. Even subtracting the costs of the Afghanistan and Iraq wars leaves American military outlay around five times that of China and 10 times that of Russia. Combine a gaggle of adversaries, enemies and rogues — Burma, Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Syria — and the U.S. spends perhaps 25 times as much. The United States is not alone. The European Union has 10 times the GDP and three times the population of Russia. Military outlay by the U.S. plus its NATO allies accounts for about 70 percent of world military spending. Add in America's other allies and friends, such as South Korea, and the total share of global military outlay hits 80 percent. In short, Washington spends what it spends not to defend America but to maintain the ability to overpower other nations. But it will become increasingly expensive for America to preserve the ability to attack countries like China. Terrorism remains a pressing security threat. However, terrorist attacks, though horrid, do not pose an existential danger. Al-Qaida is no replacement for Nazism and Communism, nuclear-topped ICBMs and armored divisions. Nor is traditional military force the best way to combat terrorism. Indeed, foreign intervention often promotes terrorism, like swatting a hornet's nest. America's military spending is determined by its foreign policy. America's commitments are a matter of choice. They don't make sense today. Engagement is good, but military force is not the only form of engagement. And any international involvement must balance costs and benefits. Adjusting commitments would allow a vastly different, and less expensive, force structure. The U.S. could make significant cuts and still maintain the globe's strongest and most sophisticated military — one well able to defend Americans.

## Coal Adv

### Methane Hydrate

#### Runaway methane risk emp denied

Shumard Mar 15, 2005 http://www.dailykos.com/story/2005/3/15/20439/5473

I've also heard it that some have said that methane hydrate has been implied to be something unpredictable [subtext: touchy as nitroglycerin] and dangerous in poorly understood ways. Nothing could be further from truth. Methane hydrate (a solid 'non-covalent' complex of methane and water molecules) forms spontaneously whereever the two species are present in the temperature-pressure conditions (high pressures and low temperatures) where the complex is stable. The critical points and thermodynamics of the hydrate formation and dissociation processess are well characterized, and any chemical engineer worth his/her salt can figure the thermal factors and parameters involved that are needed to design safe methane extraction equipment and collection procedures . Regarding those scary methane flashes causing climate change, landslides etc, well I've got another hot flash. Incalculably enormous amounts of methane from the mid oceanic ridges[ subscription required], volcanoes, and other geologic features large and small, and have been pumping out mantle formed methane continously for at least the past couple billions of years. Once again Methane = Clean natural gas. Nothing strange here or reason be afraid of it.

#### Renewables solve the whole case

NREL, “Strengthening U.S. Leadership of International Clean Energy Cooperation,” December 2008, http://www.nrel.gov/international/pdfs/44261.pdf, accessed 6-20-2012.

Energy Security Benefits In addition to the decreased oil prices mentioned above, international clean energy market transformation will reduce global vulnerability to supply and price shocks, and could also decrease tensions over petroleum resources in key supply regions and U.S. costs of military intervention to help address conflicts that arise. Reductions in U.S. demand for oil, which will be enabled by accelerated cost reductions for biofuels and transportation efficiency technologies through international cooperation, also will decrease U.S. vulnerability. Impacts on Development The clean energy market transformation will accelerate global economic growth and stability by enhancing access to clean energy in rural and urban areas worldwide. More than 1 billion people around the world do not have modern energy services. Providing access to clean energy will provide the power necessary for micro-enterprises, health clinics, schools, water supply, enhanced agricultural production, and similar services. U.S. leadership in this area will enhance diplomatic influence and help achieve U.S. and global sustainable development objectives, including universal access to modern energy services around the world by 2020, which is consistent with the Millennium Development Goals.

### A2: Nat Gas Now

#### Natural Gas prices will not stay low long enough to crowd out renewable energy

Richard Harris, “Could Cheap Gas Slow Growth Of Renewable Energy?,” NPR, February 2, 2012, http://www.npr.org/2012/02/02/146297284/could-cheap-gas-slow-growth-of-renewable-energy, accessed 7-5-2012.

**\*\*\*Quotes Trevor Houser who is an energy analyst at the Rhodium Group where he leads the energy and natural resources work, visiting fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics, was a senior advisor for the U.S. State Department in 2009.\*\*\***

"Long-term renewable deployment in the U.S. is going to depend primarily on policy," Houser says. "Is there enough concern about environmental consequences to put in place incentives for renewable energy?" That partly depends on how much of a premium people and companies will be willing to pay for cleaner energy. Right now, with natural gas so cheap, that premium is fairly substantial. "If those prices hang around for another three or four years, then I think you'll definitely see reduced political will for renewable energy deployment, " Houser says. "But we don't expect prices that low to hang around that long, because low prices are in many ways self-correcting." Gas is so cheap now that companies that produce it are struggling to make a profit. So Houser expects prices to move up. That will help close the price gap between gas and renewable energy.

### Baseload 2NC

#### Renewables can provide base-load power – multiple warrants

Dr Mark Diesendorf is Deputy Director of the Institute of Environmental Studies at University of New South Wales., previously, as a Principal Research Scientist in CSIRO, he led a research group on the integration of wind power into electricity grids, author and co-author of several national energy scenario studies, “The Base Load Fallacy and other Fallacies disseminated by Renewable Energy Deniers,” Energy Science Coalition, March 2010, http://www.energyscience.org.au/BP16%20BaseLoad.pdf, accessed 8-17-2012.

Opponents of renewable energy, from the coal and nuclear industries and from NIMBY (Not In My Backyard) groups, are disseminating the Base-Load Fallacy, that is, the fallacy that renewable energy cannot provide base-load (24-hour) power to substitute for coal-fired electricity. In Australia, even Government Ministers and some journalists are propagating this conventional ‘wisdom’, although it is false. This fallacy is the principal weapon of renewable energy deniers. Other fallacies are discussed briefly in the appendix. The political implications are that, if these fallacies become widely believed, renewable energy would always have to remain a niche market, rather than achieve its true potential of becoming a set of mainstream energy supply technologies with the capacity to supply all of Australia’s and indeed the world’s electricity. The refutation of the fallacy has the following key logical steps: • With or without renewable energy, there is no such thing as a perfectly reliable power station or electricity generating system. Both coal and nuclear power are only partially reliable. • Electricity grids are already designed to handle variability in both demand and supply. To do this, they have different types of power station (base-load, intermediate-load and peak-load) and reserve power stations. • Wind power and solar power without storage provide additional sources of variability to be integrated into a system that already has to balance a variable conventional supply against a variable demand. • The variability of small amounts of wind and solar power in a grid is indistinguishable from variations in demand. Therefore, existing peak-load plant and reserve plant can handle small amounts of wind and solar power at negligible extra cost. • Some renewable electricity sources (e.g. bioenergy, solar thermal electricity with thermal storage and geothermal) have similar patterns of variability to coal-fired power stations and so they can be operated as base-load. They can be integrated without any additional back-up, as can efficient energy use. • Other renewable electricity sources (e.g. wind, solar without storage, and run-of-river hydro) have different kinds of variability from coal-fired power stations and so have to be considered separately. • Single wind turbines cut-in and cut-out suddenly in low wind speeds and so can be described as ‘intermittent’. • But, for large amounts of wind power connected to the grid from several wind farms that are geographically dispersed in different wind regimes, total wind power generally varies smoothly and therefore cannot be described accurately as ‘intermittent’. Like coal and 3 nuclear power, wind power is a partially reliable source of power (Sinden 2007). However, its statistics are different from those of coal and nuclear power. • As the penetration into the grid of wind energy increases substantially, so do the additional costs of reserve plant and fuel used for balancing wind power variations. However, when wind power supplies up to 20% of electricity generation, these additional costs are relatively small.

#### A variety of renewables are capable of providing base-load

Dr Mark Diesendorf is Deputy Director of the Institute of Environmental Studies at University of New South Wales., previously, as a Principal Research Scientist in CSIRO, he led a research group on the integration of wind power into electricity grids, author and co-author of several national energy scenario studies, “The Base Load Fallacy and other Fallacies disseminated by Renewable Energy Deniers,” Energy Science Coalition, March 2010, http://www.energyscience.org.au/BP16%20BaseLoad.pdf, accessed 8-17-2012.

Renewable energy can provide several different clean, safe, base-load technologies to substitute for base-load coal: • bioenergy, based for example on the direct combustion of crop and plantation forestry residues, or their gasification followed by combustion of the gas; • geothermal power – a new type of geothermal power (called hot rock, enhanced or engineered geothermal) is being developed in Australia, the USA and Europe; • solar thermal electricity, with overnight thermal storage in molten salt, water, graphite or a thermochemical store such as ammonia; • hydro-electricity in regions with very large storages (eg, Sweden, Iceland, Tasmania); • large-scale, distributed wind power, with a small amount of occasional back-up from peakload plant. It is obvious that the first four of these types of renewable power station are indeed base-load. Efficient energy use and solar hot water, the natural companions of renewable electricity, can also substitute directly for base-load coal. However, the inclusion of large-scale wind power in the above list may be a surprise to some people, because wind power is often described as an ‘intermittent’ source, one that switches on and off frequently. Before discussing the variability of wind power, we introduce the concept of ‘optimal mix’.

### Link 2NC

#### Renewables now- shale gas wrecks them-MIT agrees

Lewis and Gloystein 08/23 [Barbara Lewis and Henning Gloystein 08/23/2012 “EU Green Energy Drive Says No To Shale Gas, Looks Towards More Renewable Power Sources” Huffington Post http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/08/23/eu-green-energy-shale-gas-europe\_n\_1823901.html]

Researchers at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) say this is good news for renewables.¶ "When shale is removed from the market, renewables gain more ground," they wrote in a report earlier this year.¶ Investment in renewable energy rose by 5 percent to a record $260 billion worldwide in 2011, even though the growth rate slowed along with the global economy. But that growth depended to a large degree on government subsidies.

### Climate Leadership Impact 2NC

#### Climate leadership five extinction threats- Biodiversity, soil erosion, ocean acidification, de-fo, pollution

**Khosla 2009** (Ashok Khosla, president of the International Union for Conservation of Nature, January 27, 2009, “A new President for the United States: We have a dream,” http://goo.gl/RQsL8)

A rejuvenated America, with a renewed purpose, commitment and energy to make its contribution once again towards a better world could well be the turning point that can reverse the current decline in the state of the global economy, the health of its life support systems and the morale of people everywhere. This extraordinary change in regime brings with it the promise of a deep change in attitudes and aspirations of Americans, a change that will lead, hopefully, to new directions in their nation’s policies and action. In particular, we can hope that from being a very reluctant partner in global discussions, especially on issues relating to environment and sustainable development, the United States will become an active leader in international efforts to address the Millennial threats now confronting civilization and even the survival of the human species. For the conservation of biodiversity, so essential to maintaining life on Earth, this promise of change has come not a moment too soon. It would be a mistake to put all of our hopes on the shoulder of one young man, however capable he might be. The environmental challenges the world is facing cannot be addressed by one country, let alone by one man. At the same time, an inspired US President guided by competent people, who does not shy away from exercising the true responsibilities and leadership his country is capable of, could do a lot to spur the international community into action. To paraphrase one of his illustrious predecessors, “the world asks for action and action now.” What was true in President Roosevelt’s America 77 years ago is even more appropriate today. From IUCN’s perspective, the first signals are encouraging. The US has seriously begun to discuss constructive engagement in climate change debates. With Copenhagen a mere 11 months away, this commitment is long overdue and certainly very welcome. Many governments still worry that if they set tough standards to control carbon emissions, their industry and agriculture will become uncompetitive, a fear that leads to a foot-dragging “you go first” attitude that is blocking progress. A positive intervention by the United States could provide the vital catalyst that moves the basis of the present negotiations beyond the narrowly defined national interests that lie at the heart of the current impasse. The logjam in international negotiations on climate change should not be difficult to break if the US were to lead the industrialized countries to agree that much of their wealth has been acquired at the expense of the environment (in this case greenhouse gases emitted over the past two hundred years) and that with the some of the benefits that this wealth has brought, comes the obligation to deal with the problems that have resulted as side-effects. With equitable entitlement to the common resources of the planet, an agreement that is fair and acceptable to all nations should be easy enough to achieve. Caps on emissions and sharing of energy efficient technologies are simply in the interest of everyone, rich or poor. And both rich and poor must now be ready to adopt less destructive technologies – based on renewables, efficiency and sustainability – both as a goal with intrinsic merit and also as an example to others. But climate is not the only critical global environmental issue that this new administration will have to deal with. Conservation of biodiversity, a crucial prerequisite for the wellbeing of all humanity, no less America, needs as much attention, and just as urgently. The United States’ self-interest in conserving living natural resources strongly converges with the global common good in every sphere: in the oceans, by arresting the precipitate decline of fish stocks and the alarming rise of acidification; on land, by regenerating the health of our soils, forests and rivers; and in the atmosphere by reducing the massive emission of pollutants from our wasteful industries, construction, agriculture and transport systems.

#### Biodiversity key to survival.

Young, 10, Dr Ruth Young, PhD specialising in coastal marine ecology. 2-9-2010, “Biodiversity: what it is and why it’s important”, http://www.talkingnature.com/2010/02/biodiversity/biodiversity-what-and-why/

Different species within ecosystems fill particular roles, they all have a function, they all have a niche. They interact with each other and the physical environment to provide ecosystem services that are vital for our survival. For example plant species convert carbon dioxide (CO2) from the atmosphere and energy from the sun into useful things such as food, medicines and timber. A bee pollinating a flower (Image: ClearlyAmbiguous Flickr) Pollination carried out by insects such as bees enables the production of ⅓ of our food crops. Diverse mangrove and coral reef ecosystems provide a wide variety of habitats that are essential for many fishery species. To make it simpler for economists to comprehend the magnitude of services offered by biodiversity, a team of researchers estimated their value – it amounted to $US33 trillion per year. “By protecting biodiversity we maintain ecosystem services” Certain species play a “keystone” role in maintaining ecosystem services. Similar to the removal of a keystone from an arch, the removal of these species can result in the collapse of an ecosystem and the subsequent removal of ecosystem services. The most well known example of this occurred during the 19th century when sea otters were almost hunted to extinction by fur traders along the west coast of the USA. This led to a population explosion in the sea otters’ main source of prey, sea urchins. Because the urchins graze on kelp their booming population decimated the underwater kelp forests. This loss of habitat led to declines in local fish populations. Sea otters are a keystone species once hunted for their fur (Image: Mike Baird) Eventually a treaty protecting sea otters allowed the numbers of otters to increase which inturn controlled the urchin population, leading to the recovery of the kelp forests and fish stocks. In other cases, ecosystem services are maintained by entire functional groups, such as apex predators (See Jeremy Hance’s post at Mongabay). During the last 35 years, over fishing of large shark species along the US Atlantic coast has led to a population explosion of skates and rays. These skates and rays eat bay scallops and their out of control population has led to the closure of a century long scallop fishery. These are just two examples demonstrating how biodiversity can maintain the services that ecosystems provide for us, such as fisheries. One could argue that to maintain ecosystem services we don’t need to protect biodiversity but rather, we only need to protect the species and functional groups that fill the keystone roles. However, there are a couple of problems with this idea. First of all, for most ecosystems we don’t know which species are the keystones! Ecosystems are so complex that we are still discovering which species play vital roles in maintaining them. In some cases its groups of species not just one species that are vital for the ecosystem. Second, even if we did complete the enormous task of identifying and protecting all keystone species, what back-up plan would we have if an unforseen event (e.g. pollution or disease) led to the demise of these ‘keystone’ species? Would there be another species to save the day and take over this role? Classifying some species as ‘keystone’ implies that the others are not important. This may lead to the non-keystone species being considered ecologically worthless and subsequently over-exploited. Sometimes we may not even know which species are likely to fill the keystone roles. An example of this was discovered on Australia’s Great Barrier Reef. This research examined what would happen to a coral reef if it were over-fished. The “over-fishing” was simulated by fencing off coral bommies thereby excluding and removing fish from them for three years. By the end of the experiment, the reefs had changed from a coral to an algae dominated ecosystem – the coral became overgrown with algae. When the time came to remove the fences the researchers expected herbivorous species of fish like the parrot fish (Scarus spp.) to eat the algae and enable the reef to switch back to a coral dominated ecosystem. But, surprisingly, the shift back to coral was driven by a supposed ‘unimportant’ species – the bat fish (Platax pinnatus). The bat fish was previously thought to feed on invertebrates – small crabs and shrimp, but when offered a big patch of algae it turned into a hungry herbivore – a cow of the sea – grazing the algae in no time. So a fish previously thought to be ‘unimportant’ is actually a keystone species in the recovery of coral reefs overgrown by algae! Who knows how many other species are out there with unknown ecosystem roles! In some cases it’s easy to see who the keystone species are but in many ecosystems seemingly unimportant or redundant species are also capable of changing niches and maintaining ecosystems. The more biodiverse an ecosystem is, the more likely these species will be present and the more resilient an ecosystem is to future impacts. Presently we’re only scratching the surface of understanding the full importance of biodiversity and how it helps maintain ecosystem function. The scope of this task is immense. In the meantime, a wise insurance policy for maintaining ecosystem services would be to conserve biodiversity. In doing so, we increase the chance of maintaining our ecosystem services in the event of future impacts such as disease, invasive species and of course, climate change. This is the international year of biodiversity – a time to recognize that biodiversity makes our survival on this planet possible and that our protection of biodiversity maintains this service.

### Climate Talks Now

#### Positive momentum toward successful climate talks and action now.

UPI 9-6 http://www.upi.com/Business\_News/Energy-Resources/2012/09/06/UN-touts-climate-change-talks-progress/UPI-52771346952337/

BANGKOK, Sept. 6 (UPI) -- The United Nations said progress was made at the latest climate talks in Bangkok.

The talks, which concluded Wednesday, were intended to prepare the way for major climate change meetings Nov. 26-Dec 7, in Doha, Qatar.¶ "There are still some tough political decisions ahead but we now have a positive momentum and a greater sense of convergence that will stimulate higher-level political discussions ahead of Doha and set a faster pace of work once this year's conference begins," Christiana Figueres, executive secretary of the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, said in a statement Wednesday.¶ Major topics covered in the Bangkok meeting included extending and amending the 1997 greenhouse-gas limiting Kyoto Protocol and delivering a road map for a new legally binding climate treaty, which is to be agreed upon by 2015 and go into effect by 2020.¶ The United Nations said specific objectives for Doha were set at the Bangkok meeting. Among the goals is triggering a new phase of climate action and filling in the gaps in the international policy response to climate change.¶ Progress was also made, the United Nations says, in areas including the financing mechanism to reduce emissions from deforestation and forest degradation and identifying points in which negotiating groups might require additional decisions to reach an agreement in Doha.

### 2NC Link

#### They may like natural gas but don’t think we should frack more of it

Lewis and Gloystein 08/23 [Barbara Lewis and Henning Gloystein 08/23/2012 “EU Green Energy Drive Says No To Shale Gas, Looks Towards More Renewable Power Sources” Huffington Post http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/08/23/eu-green-energy-shale-gas-europe\_n\_1823901.html]

A series of European Commission road maps envisage virtually carbon-neutral power generation by the middle of the century.¶ Unless carbon capture and storage can be developed on a commercial scale, that means gas as a fuel has a limited future and should not be invested in too heavily, environmental campaigners say.¶ They are especially against shale gas, whose environmental credentials are questioned in Europe.¶ "We need natural gas as a transition fuel. However, we don't need such a huge amount of gas and certainly not cheap gas, because that would kick out not just coal, but also renewables," Greenpeace renewable energy director Sven Teske said.

### A2: Russia Energy Add On

#### Russia is losing their monopoly- Middle East producers

Hulbert and Goldthau 2012 [Matthew Hulbert Lead Analyst at European Energy Review and consultant to a number of governments, most recently as Senior Research Fellow, Netherlands Institute for International Relations and Andreas Goldthau Head of the Department of Public Policy at the Central European University, an American graduate school based in Budapest, Hungary. Prior to joining CEU, he worked for Rand, SWP Germany and the Paul Nitze School of Advanced International Studies. He is also a Fellow with the Global Public Policy Institute’s Global Energy Governance program and an Adjunct Professor with Johns Hopkins University’s MSc in Energy Policy and Climate 8/05/2012 Forbes “Why America Can Make or Break A New Global Gas World” http://www.forbes.com/sites/matthewhulbert/2012/08/05/why-america-can-make-or-break-a-new-global-gas-world/]

With that in mind, we’ll start off by taking a brief look at the ‘climatic conditions’ that have made global gas convergence a serious debate, examining reduced OECD demand and meteoric unconventional gains in the US. That’s freed up vast swathes of LNG tankers from the Middle East that should have hit US ports to find their way to European hubs instead. European utilities contracted to expensive Russian pipeline gas have been bleeding customers and cash ever since, constantly being undercut by new market entrants using spot purchases to good effect over term prices. As a result, European wholesale hubs are seriously challenging Russo-German border prices, and as yet, no conclusive winner has emerged given conflicting ‘fundamentals’ in play. But this battle over pricing models isn’t just being waged in Europe; it increasingly divides Asia as well. To add the Pacific dimension, we then turn to China: Beijing has been notoriously stubborn signing oil-indexed contracts over the past two years, irrespective of the vendors involved. It’s put itself in a great pricing position as it has plenty of options to source its gas. Nobody is going to make a dud move signing up overpriced contracts with the prospect of new export giants emerging in the next five to ten years: Least of all, the Middle Kingdom.

#### Qatar is cutting into Russian markets- decreasing their leverage

Hulbert and Goldthau 2012 [Matthew Hulbert Lead Analyst at European Energy Review and consultant to a number of governments, most recently as Senior Research Fellow, Netherlands Institute for International Relations and Andreas Goldthau Head of the Department of Public Policy at the Central European University, an American graduate school based in Budapest, Hungary. Prior to joining CEU, he worked for Rand, SWP Germany and the Paul Nitze School of Advanced International Studies. He is also a Fellow with the Global Public Policy Institute’s Global Energy Governance program and an Adjunct Professor with Johns Hopkins University’s MSc in Energy Policy and Climate 8/05/2012 Forbes “Why America Can Make or Break A New Global Gas World” http://www.forbes.com/sites/matthewhulbert/2012/08/05/why-america-can-make-or-break-a-new-global-gas-world/]

But what’s actually doing so much damage to Russia’s Eastern ‘strategy’ is the fact that China can point to independent gas benchmarks in Europe as a credible price points for ‘Sino-Soviet’ deals. That brings us directly back to Qatar’s door as the main primer of European liquidity. The tiny Middle Eastern state is trying to play a very clever game that’s not just about maximising receipts, but enhancing its global potential. If the former was the case, it would’ve already exited the European market when we consider netbacks on Qatari spot into Asian ports have been about $14/MMBtu, twice the figure achieved on UK / North West Europe deliveries. Rather Qatar’s medium term strategy is to keep feeding European spot markets as a transitional step towards an Asian future. Many think Doha would even need to see Asian spot prices hit $25/MMbtu before it comprehensively exited European markets.¶ Admittedly, it’s an ‘open secret’ that Qatar is trying to place up to 50 million tonnes of LNG into Asian markets over the next few years, ramping up the 34 million tonnes it already ships out East. India, South Korea, Taiwan and Japan are relatively easy recipients, but the market Doha really wants to nail down is China, where it has a very limited presence to date. Qatargas is yet to reach any conclusive agreements over contract duration and pricing formulas for full oil parity. The Gulf State has actually only sold around 2mt/y at significant discounts into Asia, making clear that its vast riches (both in geological and paper form) don’t need to instantly rake in the RMB to stay afloat. As long as it keeps feeding European markets, the underlying hedge is that China will have to pay a decent price on decent terms for Doha to turn most of its tankers East.¶ Maybe so, but this entails a very delicate balancing act for Doha to get right, and it’s one that ultimately points towards discounts on long term gas agreements with Beijing. As much as Qatar wants a good price for its gas, it still needs to head off a full scale Pacific Basin pricing war with over 50mt/y expected to come online in the region in the next few years. Leave things too late, and it risks dropping the Beijing ball altogether. Indeed, change seats for a moment and look at this from China’s perspective. Not only does Beijing have a raft of supply options to draw on in the next five years, they are more than happy not to take too much Qatari gas at premium prices. Allowing European spot prices to burgeon on the back of Qatari gas is coming in remarkably handy for China, specifically because it knows in the longer term it has to start sourcing large amounts of Russia gas. China would much rather forego relatively small quantities of Qatari supplies to maintain spot prices on European hubs now, in order to drive a harder bargain procuring far larger quantities of Russian gas in future. China is so ahead of the curve that it refuses to touch Russian West Siberian supplies, precisely because it’s worried Moscow could simultaneously supply Beijing and Brussels with the same fields. If Russia wants ‘in’ on Chinese markets, it has to develop fresh East Siberian fields.

# 1NR

### Case outweighs/Energy InTERdependence

#### Exceptionalism is the best explanation for conflict

Edward Rhodes Dean of George Mason University’s School of Public Policy Security Studies Volume 21, Issue 2, 2012 “Why Nations Fight: Spirit, Identity, and Imagined Community” Taylor and Francis

To use Lebow's terminology, a civic construction of identity has interesting implications for how spirit is manifested. Because they place the state at the center of identity, civic constructions of the nation create pressure for the glorification of one's state and an insistence that one's state (not one's biology, religion, language, or culture) is better than that of the other. Manifestations or embodiments of the state take on symbolic importance even in the absence of “real” significance: being the first state to travel into space or to reach the moon, or the state with the greatest number (or largest size) of nuclear missiles takes on a significance that would be otherwise inexplicable. After all, if membership in a national group is defined by allegiance to a particular state (and if individuals are potentially free to choose to give allegiance to another state), the greatness of our state becomes essential to our view of ourselves and our willingness to contribute to and to continue to belong to this imagined community. In terms of “threat,” anything that challenges the state and its sovereignty directly endangers the nation's very existence—something that is not true if the nation is constructed in other ways. (In other constructions of national identity, the state may be extremely useful, but it is not essential for the nation's existence. Consider, for example, the experience of the Polish, Kurdish, and Palestinian nations.) This has interesting implications for the potential for tolerating super-sovereign authorities, and may help to explain the paranoia of some Americans regarding the League of Nations and the United Nations. Interestingly, by drawing our attention to the importance of spirit, Lebow's analysis helps us to understand why “civic” nations are so enormously sensitive to insults to symbols of the state—why burning an American flag, for example, provokes paroxysms of national outrage. So, why do nations fight? A constructivist extension of Lebow's analysis suggests that it depends on the markers that nations use to define themselves, and thus on what engages their spirit. Lebow insightfully draws our attention to the fact that in our social scientific drive for parsimonious explanation we would be ill-advised to reduce our accounts of human motivation simply to fear and interest. As he notes, war plays an evolving role not only in addressing fear and interest but in satisfying other human emotions and needs as well, perhaps most importantly in addressing expressions of spirit. But a constructivist would add that spirit, like interest and security, is socially constructed: “self-esteem” and “honor” are defined in social context and through social interaction. In the abstract, they cannot meaningfully be used to explain or predict real-word behavior. It is only as they are constructed in actual practice—that is, only as political communities come to construct their identities—that these manifestations of spirit take on content. It is in the interaction between spirit and the various ways humans define and create the borders of national communities that we can find explanations for the patterns of violent conflict that we see in today's world, and are likely to see in tomorrow's.

#### Exceptional logic collapses heg- causes overstretch

Edwards 2012 [Jason A. is Assistant Professor of Communication Studies at Bridgewater State University in Massachusetts.¶ Rhetoric & Public Affairs¶ Volume 15, Number 2, Summer 2012 “An Exceptional Debate:¶ The Championing of and Challenge to American Exceptionalism” Project Muse]

Andrew Bacevich’s The Limits of Power, like Hodgson’s work, challenges [End Page 358] America’s exceptionalist ethos. A primary difference between the two books is that Bacevich does not deny that the United States is exceptional; rather, he maintains that exceptionalism as it is currently construed has been one of the leading culprits in America’s current crisis. Since the beginning of the War on Terror, Bacevich has advocated, in two previous books, that the United States needs to revise its foreign policy, and he has argued that the United States has begun a slow march to empire.9 Those two books laid the groundwork for many of the ideas presented in The Limits of Power. However, this book is his manifesto.¶ Over an introduction, three chapters, and a conclusion, Bacevich argues that the malevolent actions of Saddam Hussein and Osama Bin Laden cannot explain why the United States seems to be perpetually involved in conflict. Instead of looking abroad for an explanation, Bacevich perceives the crisis is “of our own making” (6). It stems from America’s supposed providential duty to spread freedom. “Freedom is the altar at which Americans worship, whatever their nominal religious persuasion,” Bacevich asserts (6). Conversely, that freedom comes at great cost. As Americans pursued freedom, they generated a penchant for empire. Consequently, they racked up obligations and debts that make it increasingly difficult for the United States to operate within the world. While the country increased its commitments abroad, it has not sacrificed at home. Our appetites for consumption continue to grow. Demand for cheap products and our sense of entitlement because of American power have led the United States to a set of interlocking crises—economic, political, and military—that put America’s domestic health at risk. The Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts exacerbate a problem that has been building since the end of World War II. Yet it is those conflicts that may serve as a wake-up call for the United States to get its political house in order.¶ In the next three chapters, Bacevich chronicles these interlocking crises. The first crisis is profligacy. Bacevich asserts that if there is one word that currently characterizes American identity, it is the word “more” (16). Similar to Hodgson, Bacevich traces this profligacy crisis to the 1970s. Over the past forty years, the average American’s pursuit of happiness has been found in what she or he consumes, while shedding any civic constraint that might interfere with this consumption. The foreign policy implication for this consumption has “given birth to a condition of profound dependency” (16). Americans have not lost the ethic of hard work, but our current way of life outstrips our domestic capacity to satisfy our consumption. Accordingly, Republican and Democratic presidents expand our international [End Page 359] commitments, engagements, and skirmishes to assure our way of life. All the while, Americans have never been called upon to sacrifice. Correspondingly, Bacevich opines that “Americans have yet to realize that they have forfeited command of their own destiny. The relationship between expansionism, abundance, and freedom—each reinforcing the other—no longer exists. If anything, the reverse is true: Expansionism squanders American wealth and power, while putting freedom at risk” (65–66).¶ In chapter 2, Bacevich identifies the political crisis the United States faces. This crisis stems primarily from three areas. First, over the past sixty years the United States has created an ideology of national security. This ideology asserts that America, as the embodiment and herald of freedom, must pursue an international agenda where freedom must prevail everywhere, thus ensuring America’s way of life. The ideology does not prescribe any specific action, but it has become hard-wired into America’s psyche, compelling the United States to act because it believes it has a providential duty to do so. That duty led to America’s involvement in places it never should have gone. A second area that created this crisis has been the expansion of a national security apparatus. The United States spends billions of dollars and has millions of personnel working in some way, shape, or form to maintain a huge presence around the world. The apparatus has grown so large and entrenched that the United States appears compelled to maintain a constant military presence so the apparatus does not shrink, lest it cost hundreds of thousands of Americans their jobs. Finally, presidents have increasingly relied on a series of “wise men” to help them make foreign policy, offering advice that supports an expansion of America’s presence abroad and that often has led the United States to pursue foreign policy adventures that become too costly, in blood and treasure, to bear.¶ Chapter 3 identifies America’s military crisis. Bacevich maintains that Americans have over-appraised the utility of American military power. This over-appraisal comes from three illusions. First, Americans became convinced that our use of force in the 1980s was more precise, discriminating, and potentially humane than ever before. Second, America’s civilian and military leaders subscribed to a set of principles that promised to prevent any recurrence of Vietnam. Finally, the military and American society patched up the differences that became apparent during the Vietnam years. These illusions led the United States to pursue a series of small wars that perpetuated a sense of invincibility about America’s military might. The failure to achieve quick or decisive victories in Iraq and Afghanistan, he argues, suggests that [End Page 360] we have not fully learned the lessons of the past and thus have continued to pursue the same policies over the past thirty years.¶ Despite these crises, Bacevich argues that the failure in Iraq might finally wake up America’s politicians and people. He asserts that to cure these crises the United States must accept limits upon its power. It must give up its penchant for unilateralism and negotiate with its partners. It must abandon the idea that it can tutor anyone, including the Muslim world, on the matters of freedom. As he puts it, “[T]he principle informing policy should be this: Let Islam be Islam. In the end, Muslims will have to discover for themselves the shortcomings of political Islam, much as the Russians discovered the defects in Marxism-Leninism and the Chinese came to appreciate the flaws in Maoism” (177). For Bacevich, the current notion of American exceptionalism—that the United States must spread freedom around the world and pursue any policy it wants—is doomed to fail. Instead, the United States must approach the world for how it is and not how it wants it to be. It must obey the rules that apply to other countries. If not, any exceptional nature that America has left will surely see its end.

#### Americans have a tendency to overestimate our benefits to the world- prevents effective policy

Walt 2011[Stephen M. Walt, an FP contributing editor, is Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international affairs at Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government NOVEMBER 2011, Foreign Policy, “The Myth of American Exceptionalism” http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/10/11/the\_myth\_of\_american\_exceptionalism]

Bottom line: Americans take too much credit for global progress and accept too little blame for areas where U.S. policy has in fact been counterproductive. Americans are blind to their weak spots, and in ways that have real-world consequences. Remember when Pentagon planners thought U.S. troops would be greeted in Baghdad with flowers and parades? They mostly got RPGs and IEDs instead.

### Framework 2NC (Short)

#### We meet- the alternative just rejects the aff

#### Counterinterp- You should consider yourself a critical intellectual- if the Affirmative’s methodology is bad then you should vote negative to reject their political project

#### Methodological focus is good

#### Prevents debates from becoming the series of UQ tricks - this skews the debates away from the core of the controversy in energy policy to a debate about what the Squo is

#### Focuses the debate and increases clash- you should have to defend the way that the Aff approaches energy policy- especially true on a topic where you have enormous options about what method to use

#### We are intellectuals not policymakers- this means you should think more about the academic content than the political ramifications-Now is the key time to question exceptionalism- we have to make a decision about our future course

Edwards 2012 [Jason A. is Assistant Professor of Communication Studies at Bridgewater State University in Massachusetts.¶ Rhetoric & Public Affairs¶ Volume 15, Number 2, Summer 2012 “An Exceptional Debate:¶ The Championing of and Challenge to American Exceptionalism” Project Muse]

The hullabaloo over Obama’s rhetoric is symptomatic of a larger debate in the United States concerning its exceptionalist ethos, which is fundamental to questions concerning who we are as Americans, where we are going, and how we relate to the world around us.7 American exceptionalism is the belief that the United States is unique among, if not superior to, other nation-states. It is the fundamental agent that has underwritten arguments concerning America’s destiny.8 Currently, our exceptionalist ethos is in flux, partly because of the drumbeat of American decline that has become a constant refrain in American politics. Accordingly, the nature of American exceptionalism and how we enact that exceptionalism is under debate. A number of recent works have spoken to how American exceptionalism has manifested itself in U.S. history, how it can be restored, and how it endangers the United States. Read together, these works demonstrate the power and seduction that American exceptionalism still holds in U.S. politics and culture. My [End Page 352] aim in this review essay is to outline the contours of the debate concerning American exceptionalism, while providing insight into its specific flashpoints, champions, and challengers. Ultimately, the books reviewed here point to present and future self-reflection Americans must have about who they are and how they interact with the outside world.

#### These arguments all implicate the nature of a permutation- if we win our method first offense the perms become incoherent

#### Don’t settle on the lazy cop out that they get to weigh their aff- they will always have a reason why the impact is try or die so even if we aren’t sure we should act- this creates a rigged game which is the state of emergency which justifies exceptionalism and violence

### Permutation

#### First, the alternative solves- Walt evidence says that rethinking political discourses produces new ways of understanding American identity- Prerequisite to political action-

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I begin this review essay with Sylvia Söderlind and James Taylor Carson’s edited collection American Exceptionalisms, which chronicles how exceptionalism has manifested itself throughout U.S. history. These essays, according to the introduction, illustrate “both the history and the pervasiveness of the assumptions underlying the political debate about the role of the United States in the world. Our premise is that exceptionalism . . . inflects every discourse involving relations between the United States and its—internal as well as external—others and that even dissenting counterdiscourses rely on the commonality of assumptions underlying the national ethos” (9). Through 11 chapters and an afterword, Söderlind and Carson have gathered together a group of scholars who have a common desire to “understand how and why the rhetoric of exceptionalism has shaped, and continues to shape, the writing of history and culture in the United States” (9). I highlight four representative chapters.

#### Perm doesn’t solve the link- discourses of energy policy determine the solutions that we attempt

Laura Nader University of California, Berkeley Anthropological Quarterly 77.4 (2004) 771-791 “The Harder Path—Shifting Gears” Project Muse

I came to realize that energy discourses were often one of "no option." The inevitablity syndrome I called it. Whatever path was being proposed was a "have to path." For example, "we have to push nuclear because there are no alternatives." Such a coercive frame was limiting to say the least, especially [End Page 775] since other options were what was being examined. Method was also part of the problem. For example, growth models—that took for granted increasing per capita energy consumption—were disabling when economists (even Nobel economists) were examining less is more options. Also striking was the omnipresent model of unilinear development (a concept that anthropologists had left in the dust decades earlier), with little general understanding of macro-processes. For example, the recognition that civilizations arise but that they also collapse was missing from the thinking about the present. Prevalent was the nineteenth century belief that technological progress was equivalent to social progress. In such a progressivist evolutionary frame science too could only rise and not fall or wane. Furthermore, the possibility that experts might be part of the problem was novel to the expert who thought that he stood outside of the problem. The idea that the energy problem had human dimensions, that it was a human problem, slowly began to sink in, although such realization was rarely attributed to social science sources. Many of my commentaries were adamantly opposed in those years, to put it mildly. Colleagues rejected the idea that the science bureaucracies had a limiting effect on definitions and solutions, and also a framing effect on cultural outlook. This view was adamantly opposed by directors at Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, and by those who believe that science is autonomous and culture free.

### Util

#### Concede util is good, proper utilitarianism can only be rule-based- They lose because they violate the exceptionalism rule

Alexander 1985 Larry Alexander University of Chicago, Ethics, 1985 P.317

In a world as complex as ours, the direct application of consequentialist principles would require substantially more information and objectivity than normal human beings can possess. Not only is it difficult for anyone to decide which particular act is optimal, but also, in turn, that difficulty makes it difficult to predict how others will act, and this adds to the difficulty of choosing the optimal act. Therefore, the Good is better achieved through the guidance of a limited number of mechanical rules that focus an actor's attention on a few easily discernable factors5 than it is by considering individually each of the complex multitude of possibly relevant factors (Gray 1983, pp. 35, 47; Hare 1981, p. 35; Nelson 1980, pp. 199-201; Sartorius 1975, p. 52; Baron 1982, p. 554; Farrell 1980, pp. 199-201; Gibbard 1984, p. 280; Harsanyi 1980, p. 128; Kennedy 1973, pp. 364-65; Powers 1979, p. 1274). Moreover, such rules would be stronger than mere rules of thumb people could disregard whenever they reasonably believed that by doing so they would better achieve the Good. Rather, these rules will exclude all considerations regarding whether the Good will be achieved (Kennedy 1973, p. 35).

#### Complexity also takes out the aff

Steven Bernstein et al (Richard Ned Lebow, Janice Gross Stein, and Steven Weber, University of Toronto, Ohio State, and Berkeley) 2000 “God Gave Physics the Easy Problems: Adapting Social Science to an Unpredictable World” European Journal of International Relations vol 43 No 6

This vision has been largely lost From the vantage point of the 21st century it is sadly apparent that the founding fathers of the behavioral revolution failed to transmit as clearly the value commitments that motivated their ‘scientific’ study of international relations. For many of their students and grand-students. the ‘scientific means’ has become more an end in itself and. the ‘science’ of the social a jeu d’esprit, like chess. In the worst instances, researchers choose problems to investigate because the problems are thought to be tractable, not because they are important. They evaluate solutions in terms of the elegance of the logic rather than actual evidence. Meanwhile, on the other extreme, those who do study policy problems frequently do so in isolation from those working seriously with theory. Both communities are thus impoverished. The founders of the scientific study of international relations would bemoan the separation of theory from evidence and of logic from data.’ Most of all, the founders would reject the separation of theory from policy and its relative failure to address practical problems of the political world. A deep irony is embedded in the history of the scientific study of international relations. Recent generations of scholars separated policy rom theory to gain an intellectual distance from decision-making, in the belief that this would enhance the ‘scientific’ quality of their work. But five decades of well-funded efforts to develop theories of international relations have produced precious little in the way of useful, high confidence results. Theories abound, but few meet the most relaxed ‘scientific’ tests of validity. Even the most robust generalizations or laws we can state – war is more likely between neighboring states, weaker states are less likely to attack stronger states – are close to trivial, have important exceptions, and for the most part stand outside any consistent body of theory. A generation ago, we might have excused our performance on the grounds that we are a young science still in the process o defining problems, developing analytical tools and collecting data. This excuse is nether credible nor suficielt: there is no reason to suppose that another 50 years of well-funded research would result in anything resembling a valid theory in the Popperian sense. We suggest that the nature, goals, and criteria for judging social science theory should be rethought. , if theory s to e more helpful in understanding the real world. We begin by justifying our pessimism, both conceptually and empirically, and argue that the quest for predictive theory rests on a mistaken analogy between physical and social phenomena. Evolutionary biology is a more productive analogy for social science. We explore the value of this analogy in its ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ versions, and examine the implications of both for theory and research in international relations. We develop the case for forward ‘tracking’ of international relations on the basis of local and general knowledge as an alternative to backward-looking attempts to build deductive, nomothetic theory. We then apply this strategy to some emerging trends in international relations. This article is not a nihilistic diatribe against ‘modern’ conceptions of social science. Rather, it is a plea for constructive humility in the current context of attraction to deductive logic, falsifiable hypothesis and large – n statistical ‘tests’ of narrow propositions. We propose a practical alternative for social scientists to pursue in addition, and in a complementary fashion, to ‘scientific’ theory-testing. Physical and chemical laws make two kinds of predictions. Some phenomena – the trajectories of individual planets – can be predicted with a reasonable degree of certainty. Only a few variables need to be taken into account and they can be measured with precision. Other mechanical problems, like the break of balls on a pool table, while subject to deterministic laws are inherently unpredictable because of their complexity. Small differences in the lay of the table, the nap of the felt, the curvature of each ball and where they make contact, amplify the variance of each collision and lead to what appears as a near random distribution of balls. Most predictions in science are probabilistic, like the freezing point of liquids, the expansion rate of gases and all chemical reactions. Point predictions appear possible only because of the large number of units involved in interactions. In the case of nuclear decay or the expansion of gases, we are talking about trillions of atoms and molecules. In international relations, even more than in other domains of social science, it is often impossible to assign metrics to what we think are relevant variables (Coleman, 1964: especially Chapter 2). The concepts of polarity, relative power and balance of power are among the most widely used independent variables, but there are no commonly accepted definitions or measures for them. Yet without consensus on definition and measurement, almost every statement or hypothesis will have too much wiggle room to be ‘tested’ decisively against evidence. What we take to be dependent variables fare little better. Unresolved controversies rage over the definition and evaluation of deterrence outcomes, and about the criteria for democratic governance and their application to specific countries at different points in their history. Differences in coding for even a few cases have significant implications for tests of theories of deterrence or of the democratic peace (Lebow and Stein 1990; Chan, 1997). The lack of consensus about terms and their measurement is not merely the result of intellectual anarchy or sloppiness – although the latter cannot be entirely dismissed. Fundamentally, it has more to do with the arbitrary nature of the concepts themselves. Key terms in physics, like mass, temperature, and velocity, refer to aspects of the physical universe that we cannot directly observe. However, they are embedded in theories with deductive implications that have been verified through empirical research. Propositions containing these terms are legitimate assertions about reality because their truth-value can be assessed. Social science theories are for the most part built on ‘idealizations’, that is, on concepts that cannot be anchored to observable phenomena through rules of correspondence. Most of these terms (e.g. rational actor, balance of power) are not descriptions of reality, but implicit ‘theories’ about actors and contexts that do not exist (Hempel, 1952; Rudner, 1966; Gunnell, 1975; Me, 1979; Searle, 1995: 68-72). The inevitable differences in interpretation of these concepts lead to diferent predictions in some contexts, and these outcomes may eventually produce widely varying futures (Taylor, 1985: 55). If problems of definition, measurement and coding could be resolved, we would still find it difficult, if not impossible, to construct large enough samples of comparable cases to permit statistical analysis. It is now almost generally accepted that in the analysis of the causes of wars, the variation across time and the complexity of the interaction among putative causes makes the likelihood of a general theory extraordinarily low. Multivariate theories run into the problem of negative degrees of freedom, yet international relations rarely generates data sets in the high double digits, where larger samples do exist, they often group together cases that differ from one another in theoretically important ways. Complexity in the form of multiple causation and equifinality can also make simple statistical comparisons misleading. But it is hard to elaborate more sophisticated statistical tests until one has a deeper baseline understanding o the nature of the phenomenon under investigation, as well as the categories and variables that make up candidate causes (Geddes, 1990: 131-50; Lustick, 1996: 505-18; Jervis, 1997). Wars – to continue with the same example – are similar to chemical and nuclear reactions in that they have underlying and immediate causes. Even when all the underlying conditions are present, the processes generally require a catalyst to begin. Chain reactions are triggered b the decay of atomic nuclei. Some of the neutrons they emit strike other nuclei prompting them to fission and emit more neutrons, which strike still more nuclei. Physicists can calculate how many kilograms of Uranium 235 or Plutonium at given pressures are necessary to produce a chain reaction They can take it for granted that if a ‘critical mass’ is achieved, a chain reaction will follow. This is because trillions o atoms are present, and at any given moment enough fo them will decay to provide the neutrons needed to start the reactions. In a large enough sample, catalysts will be present in a statistical sense. Wars involve relatively few actors, unlike the weak force responsible or nuclear decay, their catalysts are probably not inherent properties of the units. Catalysts may or may not be present, and their potentially random distribution relative to underlying causes makes it difficult to predict when or if an appropriate catalyst will occur. If in the course of time underlying conditions change, reducing basic incentives for one or more parties to use force, catalysts that would have triggered war will no longer do so. This uncertain and evolving relationship between underlying and immediate causes makes point prediction extraordinarily difficult. It almost makes more general statements about the causation of war problematic, since we have no way of knowing what wars would have occurred in the presence of appropriate catalysts. It is probably impossible to define the universe of would be wars or to construct a representative sample of them. Statistical inference requires knowledge about the state of independence of cases, but in a practical sense that knowledge is often impossible to obtain in the analysis of international relations. Molecules do not learn from experience. People do, or think they do. Relationships among cases exist in the minds of decision-makers, which makes it very hard to access that information reliably and for more than just a very small number of cases. We know that expectations and behavior are influenced by experience, one’s own and others. The deterrence strategies pursued by the United States throughout much of the Cold War were one kind of response to the failure of appeasement to prevent World War II. Appeasement was at least in part a reaction to the belief of British leaders that the deterrence policies pursued by the continental powers earlier in the century had helped to provoke World War I. Neither appeasement nor deterrence can be explained without understanding the context in which they were formulated; that context is ultimately a set of mental constructs. We have descriptive terms like ‘chain reaction’ or ‘contagion effect’ to describe these patterns, and hazard analysis among other techniques in statistics to measure their strength. But neither explains how and why these patterns emerge and persist. The broader point is that the relationship between human beings and their environment is not nearly so reactive as with inanimate objects. Social relations are not clock-like because the values and behavioral repertoires of actors are not fixed; people have memories, learn from experience and undergo shits in the vocabulary they use to construct reality. Law-like relationships – even if they existed – could not explain the most interesting social outcomes, since these are precisely the outcomes about which actors have the most incetive to lear and adapt their behavior. Any regularizes would be ‘soft’; they would be the outcome of processes that are embedded in history and have a short-half-life. They would decay quickly because of the memories, creative searching and learning by political leaders. Ironically, the ‘findings’ o social science contribute to this decay (Weber, 1969; Almond and Genco, 1977: 496-522; Gunnell, 1982: Ch. 2; Ball, 1987: Chy. 4; Kratochwil, 1989; Rorty, 1989; Hollis, 1994: Ch. 9) Beyond these conceptual and empirical difficulties lies a familiar but fundamental difference of purpose. Boyle’s Law, half-lives, or any other scientific principle based on probability, says nothing about the behavior of single units such as molecules. For many theoretical and practical purposes this is adequate. But social science ultimately aspires – or should aspire – to provide insight into practical world problems that are generally part of a small or very small n. In international relations, the dynamics and outcomes o single cases are often much more important than any statistical regularities. The conception of causality on which deductive-nomological models are based, in classical physics as well as social science, requires empirical invariance under specified boundary conditions. The standard form of such a statement is this – Given A, B, and C, if X then (not) Y. This kind of bounded invariance can be found in closed systems. Open systems can be influence by external stimuli, and their structure and causal mechanism evolve as a result. Rules that describe the functioning of an open system at time T do not necessarily do so at T+1 or T+2. The boundary conditions may have changed, rendering the statement irrelevant Another axiomatic condition may have been added, and the outcome subject to multiple conjuncural causation. There is no way to know this a priori from the causal statement itself. Nor will complete knowledge (if it were possible) about the system at time T necessarily allow us to project its future course of development. In a practical sense, all social systems (and many physical and biological systems) are open. Empirical invariance doe not exist in such systems, and seemingly probabilistic invariances may be causally unrelated (Harre and Secord, 1973; Bhaskar, 1979; Collier, 1994; Patomaki, 1996; Jervis, 1997). As physicist readily admit, prediction in open systems, especially non-linear ones, is difficult, and often impossible. The risk in saying that social scientists can ‘predict’ the value of variables, in past history is that the value of these variables is already known to us, and thus we are not really making predictions. Rather, we are trying to convince each other of the logic that connects a statement of theory to an expectation about the value of a variable that derives rom that theory. As long as we can establish the parameters within which theoretical statement is valid, which is a prerequisite of generating expectations in any case, this ‘theory-testing’ or ‘evaluating’ activity is not different in a logical sense when done in past or future time. Consider how this plays out in evolutionary biology, the quintessential open system. Evolution is the result of biological change and natural selection. The former is a function of random genetic mutation and mating. The latter depends on the nature and variety of ecological ‘niches’ and the competition for them. These are in turn shaped by such factors as continental drift, the varying output of the sun, changes in the earth’s orbit, and local conditions difficult to specify,. Biologists recognize that all the primary causes of evolution are random, or if not, interact in complex, nonlinear ways, and make prediction impossible. Certain kind of outcomes can be ‘ruled out’ in a probabilistic sense, but almost never absolutely. Biologists have attempted to document the course of evolution and explain the ways in which natural selections works. Historical and theoretical work has resulted in a robust theory of evolution that permits scientific reconstruction of the past in the context of a logic that explains why things turned out the way they did.